Turkish Workers

In

Europe

An interdisciplinary study

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 85-71750
Printed in the United States of America

All orders should be addressed to:
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Bloomington, Indiana 47405

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IDENTITY CRISIS OF TURKISH MIGRANTS
First and Second Generation

Nermin Abadan-Unat

Introduction

As John Berger and Jean Mohr remind us, "every seventh man in Europe is a foreign worker." Indeed Western Europe accommodates roughly twelve million foreigners out of which approximately two million are Turks (T. C. Çalışma Barkanlıgı 1981). Unlike other immigration countries, the host countries of Europe are densely populated, the societies fully organized and the educational attainments and standards of local people are considerably higher than those of the immigrants. The "guestworkers" in these countries are required for dependent work primarily in the manufacturing industry, construction, catering and domestic service. Because of their low educational standards and professional qualifications they occupy the lowest strata of those occupations in which nevertheless they are paid standard wage rates. Furthermore the feeling of "temporariness" due to the ambivalent attitude toward return to the home country or prolongation of their stay abroad, imbues all future plans and affects their motivation toward language learning, selection of residential place and investment of their savings.

Among these "latecomers" in Europe the Turks represent, with 1.5 million in Federal Germany alone, a highly visible, predominantly not integrated ethnic group, which has incited in recent years growing feelings of animosity and even open racism. Among them the proportion of the second generation, represented by the cohort between 0-6 age (201,500) and 7-18 (382,900), is exceeding 39 percent. Along with other foreign workers, the Turks have been increasingly marginalized (Kraus 1982:3). Praised at the beginning of the big exodus, they have been negatively perceived as time passes. An opinion poll in 1982 reveals that Turks have been evaluated positively only 8 percent while 48 percent of Germans expressed themselves negatively against them (Scheuch 1982:3; Infas 1982). Magazines and the daily press frequently report about harassing resulting from racist tendencies—"Türken raus" (Turks out) is a common sight on city walls. They are torn between two juxtaposed

tendencies: on one side because of increasing xenophobic feelings and restrictive policies they aim to return to their home country, but on the other side, because of structural unemployment at home, their return is delayed until an unforeseeable future. The marginalization to which they are subject causes their withdrawal from the host society—only 46 percent of Turks have any contact with Germans. They openly prefer the ghetto way of life (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1980:520-521) which partly compensates their longing for status consistency and acknowledged identity. This type of existence among others encourages the formation and proliferation of associational groups, mainly of religious nature. Thus various sects are exercising a rather strong social control over a large number of Turkish communities in Europe. This situation of "structural marginality" and permanent uncertainty in regard of future-oriented actions, leads to serious psychological stress situations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the major causes and consequences of the inability to reconcile the above mentioned goals, namely economic integration through ongoing employment abroad versus clinging to a national identity through rejection of social integration. Special attention will be devoted to the problems of the second generation. In order to assess the multifaceted problems, a clarification of concepts seems useful.

Structural marginality

Structural marginality is the result of inequality with respect to rights and opportunities. In the case of international labor migration, double marginality develops. The conceptual analysis of this process has been presented in the most detailed way by J. Hoffmann-Nowotny's theory of societal systems (1981:74) According to this theory, migration results from structural and anomic tensions and is a process by which tensions are transformed and transferred. The theory applies to a situation where immigration flows from a context of low social status and high structural tensions into a context of higher societal status and lower structural tensions and assumes that thereby tensions are transferred from the emigration context to an immigration context.

As a result, *undercasting* appears. The absorbing system opens itself increasingly, providing thereby greater opportunities for upward mobility into higher positions of the employment structure. But of course this mobility is not perceived by the immigrants. Members of the lower stratum of the native population are pushed upwards. Immigrants, on the other hand, as a result of their

negative status ascription (foreigner) have little opportunity for mobility and remain therefore, to a great extent, at the bottom of the strata system (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1981:78).

Undercasting immigration leads to a fast upward mobility of the indigenous population. It is the indigenous group who makes best use of the available educational opportunities. As a result the consequence is a rule of growing antagonism between ingroup and outgroup (Heintz 1957:90).

Accordingly, perception of lack of opportunity, perception of discrimination and social marginality, high ambitions and low chances for realizing these ambitions increase the need for cultural, i.e., social identity. The first generation generally adopts the following patterns of behavior: illusion of returning home, consumer status orientation (neo-feudal adaptation), cultural sectarianism, or collective identity. The second generation may opt for total assimilation, rejection through agressiveness or withdrawal, apathy.

Cultural identity

In order to assess the term of cultural sectarianism, the broader concept of cultural identity has to be explored. This concept refers to the totality of signs characteristic of one society and differentiating it from another. Concepts such as language, education, social values, religion, customs, leisure-time activities and others include cultural elements. A more limited definition states that "a person's identity is determined by a set of frame of reference concerning situations (and in particular relationships within these situations) which are relevant to his place in his community or group" (Eppink 1979:27).

Because feelings of powerlessness, frustration, anomie, often encountered within migrant groups, are strongly determined by the inability of communicating, we want to deal first with the problem of language.

I. Language

1.1 Language as a communication tool for adults

One of the major, if not the most important, factors which leads to a strongly felt identity crisis lies in the inability of the migrants to communicate both with their counterparts of the host community as well as with their own children. Furthermore, a limited vocabulary resulting from a low educational level often prevents their understanding of messages and comments diffused by the media. More than any other national group, Turkish migrants are handicapped

by their poor if not non-existing knowledge of the host country's language. According to a survey carried out in 1980, 29.5 percent of Turkish workers declared not to possess any knowledge of German, only 13.5 percent among them attended a language course. (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1980:489, 492) A major reason for this lack of interest is the ambivalence about returning to their home country. All plans forged with regard to a successful reintegration in their own society prevent real motivation to learn a foreign language. What for? they are mostly asking.

A second and not negligible aspect of the lack of interest of Turkish migrants in learning another language can be explained through the type of language Turks abroad are using most of the time.

Human communication presupposes the existence of an epistemological community based on common structures of meaning. Language provides only the tool for expressing and conveying those meanings in human interaction. In this context a distinction between three kinds of languages and communication is imperative. There are the "cognitive," the "affective" and the "normative/operational" languages. The first type tends to believe in the primacy of reason. The second relies more on the primacy of imagination and intuition. The third is based on explicit or implicit structures of domination, such as law, price mechanism and all hierarchical, institutional arrangements (Tehranian 1980:250). Briefly, while the second type of language prevails in agrarian structures, highly industrialized, modern societies are bound to use the first and third type. Mass media too conveys its messages and information through the cognitive and normative type of language. Thus radio and TV programs in Turkish, along with newspaper articles, many times remain a closed-box for a relatively large group, especially the women.

Thus, an additional psychological obstacle the migrants have to overcome is to react properly and without hesitation during formal working hours and generally in public life towards production rules, safety instructions, wages and tax regulations, trade-union participation, etc. An interesting example in this regard is the proportion of Turkish workers who did not know that within their company/working place there is a mechanism of interest representation. 43.4 percent of Turkish workers did not know that they could benefit from the so-called "passive right of vote," meaning representation in the management organs (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1980:211).

Even when translated in proper Turkish, most of these rules, guidelines, technical advice—because of the abstract connotation—are hard to understand. Thus, in an post-industrial society the inability of many migrants and their family members to grasp the meanings of formal directives in work and private life—which mostly lack in consistency and continuity because of fast-changing policies—creates an intense feeling of alienation and powerlessness.

A measurable criteria of this important inability to interact with the system can be clearly seen in the accident rate of Turkish workers at home and abroad (Ansay 1980:90). A comparative study on the incidence of on-the-job accidents of Turkish workers carried out by E. M. Ansay indicates that despite the lesser provisions for job safety in the Turkish factories significantly more Turkish workers were injured on the job in Federal Germany (1980:59).

Another not negligible feature of the difficulty in communicating is the prevalence of what G. Elwert defines as "mimical signals" (1982:14), which obviously are closely connected to the culture from which they have emanated, such as throwing up the head, which means "No" for Turks, but "leave me alone" for Germans. An insistence on the use of such mimics, not only produces a breakdown of any dialogue, but increases the unwillingness of the partners to understand each other and may finally end in a "mimical dumbness"

Thus, it should not astonish anyone that the implantation of Turkish migrants in an over-organized industrial society has produced different kinds of reactions toward modernization, one of which is a reliance on self-created organizations. In a study carried out by U. Mehrlaender (1974:173), 46 percent of the Turkish workers wanted to create their own organization in order to assist them in housing, legal representation, dealing with the employer, trade-unions, etc. Not only is the trend for associational activities very strong, but increasingly the desire to be affiliated with religious activities, supported by the Süleymancı and Nurcu sects, gains in weight and volume (*Der Spiegel* 1983:86-101).

1.2 Language as a tool for education and integration

If the communication gap between adult migrants and the natives of the host country creates serious problems of understanding, the linguistic problems of the second generation acquire even more disturbing dimensions.

In this respect a threefold classification might be of help. There are three major groups of Turkish children under sixteen years of age abroad:

a. Those born abroad, or having joined their family at a tender age, having attended pre-school training, thus being totally familiar with the host country language. This group usually obtains good scholastic records but has to lead a kind of culturally "split existence," being constantly moved between two worlds. Actually they represent a minority, since only 30,000 out of 130,000 Turkish children between the ages of 3-6 living in Federal Germany are able to attend a kindergarten or pre-school training (Türk Egitimi 1982:14-15). A Turkish student describes his situation as follows:

> Each day I travel from Turkey to Germany. When I leave in the morning the house of my parents, I actually quit Turkey. I then go to my work place or to my friends and am then in Germany. In the evening, returning home, I am again in Turkey. At home I never tell anything that has happened at school, or with my friends, I just act in accordance with the expectations of my parents. When staying with my friends or at school I never mention my parents, there I am orientating myself according to the actions of my friends. (Meier-Braun 1980)

The very strong impact of this bicultural alienation quite often results in a total denial on the part of the youngster. In order to gain some kind of recognition these youngsters try to hide their real identity. They are ashamed of the clumsy and ignorant behavior of their parents, who need them to mail a letter, to shop. In some cases they even accuse their parents of some imaginary mistreatment in order to be assigned to a foster parent, who will help them achieve complete integration (Vassaf 1983:21). More often, however, the opposite occurs, and in cases of great stress these youngsters take refuge in the home country's culture by adopting conservative values.

b. The most numerous group of Turkish children are those who, in spite of having been born abroad or joined their family at a very early age, did not attend any pre-school institution, thus entered regular school with a considerable linguistic handicap. These children also possess an extremely limited vocabularly in their mother tongue, especially if both parents are working. Öztek's research of 1977 has shown that 19 percent of 5-6 year olds and 52 percent of 7-14 year olds have been either taken care of by their sisters or elder relatives, or left by themselves (Öztek et. al. 1977). The Germany survey of '80 confirms this practice: 11.8 percent of

Turkish workers' children were leading the so-called "latch-key existence," meaning that they were carrying their key around the neck and returning home after school to an empty home (Friederich-Ebert Stiftung 1980: 368).

Another important problem arises from those children not attending school at all. The former prime minister of Nordrhein Westfalen, H. Kühn, estimated that 25 percent of all guestworker children in Federal Germany do not go to school (Deutsche Bundesregierung 1980: 78). Kühn estimated in his report (1979) that more than 50 percent of all guest worker children leave school without a certificate. These youngsters thus cannot obtain any further professional training and are left without chances of getting qualified jobs that will lead to the possibility of advancement. In this regard the most striking observation comes from Bodenbender, who reminds us that the creation of barriers to social mobility among the youth of the second generation makes for a "social time bomb" (Bodenbender 1976).

The problem of being able to continue school education is another great obstacle most of the guestworker's children are not able to pass. In 1978, while approximately 30 percent of all German children continued to study either in a Gymnasium or in a Realschule, only about 4% of the Turkish pupils took advantage of this possibility. If one looks only to the Gymnasium, the figures become even more alarming: according to Ray Rist, 22 percent of the German children of the relevant age are at the Gymasium, compared to 0.0046 percent of the guestworker children (1979:244). A more recent survey confirms this trend for Turkish children as well. Thus among Turkish youngsters over 15 years of age, only 0.7 percent attended a Gymasium and 73.1 percent of all Turkish youngsters left school without a certificate (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1980:43, 45).

Among the drop-outs, no doubt the young girls are the most deprived. Their fate is to take care of household chores, not to be able to develop their personality; many among them are compelled to follow the decision taken by their parents and enter a pre-arranged marriage. Their identity has not developed organically, but followed the traditional pattern.

c. The third group of migrant worker's children are those who joined their parents at a later stage. They represent the most problematic cohort. These children arrived with high expectations, yet not equipped with the necessary knowledge to cope with an unfamiliar style of life. The double socialization process these youngsters have to go through becomes impossible for many of them

to complete. Thus they become "wanderers between two worlds." Let's follow a case study:

> Bülent's father was recruited to F. Germany in 1969. Bülent himself was born in 1960; he joined his parents in West Berlin in 1971 and was placed in the V class. When his parents moved in 1972 to Ulm, Bülent was placed again in class V. After the marital life of his parents began to disintegrate, he was sent home and worked in the kitchen of a restaurant. After the divorce of his parents, the mother moved to Munich. Bülent joined her. The extremely keen and studious boy, who had meanwhile reached the age of 13, went once more to school, again in class V, for four months. Then he realized that he could not continue. He returned to Turkey and worked as assistant chauffeur at a lemonade factory. In the spring of 1977, he returned again to Federal Germany. School knowledge: scattered. Professional ambition: to become an automobile or electrical technician. Plans for the future: to stay in Federal Germany and try to study. (GEW, 1979:29)

Indeed, the right to family reunion—a hotly-debated issue today, since the West German government intends to reduce the ceiling to 6 years old—brings with it a great many problems. The families benefit from the presence of their children by cashing in the relatively high child allowances. However, within a short period of time, these young newcomers realize that their non-existent linguistic knowledge, the heavy conditions attached to obtaining a work permit, and the precondition to undergo an apprenticeship leave them only the least desirable, low-skilled or unqualified jobs. In other words, they have to fulfill the same jobs that their fathers held. Deeply frustrated, their psychological problems turn soon into agressiveness, either self-inflicted (such as drug addiction) or other-directed (such as hooliganism and other forms of juvenile delinquency, including a relatively high rate of hetero- and homosexual prostitution).

Some of them are "running away"—the social worker simply states that they "left home." Their legal position has created especially dramatic situations in Holland (Weten Schappelijke RAAD 1979:143-144). A 1978 law is in effect denying parental right of custody in cases where the court takes a different stand and argues the verdict as taken in the interests of the child. In such cases the courts may assign the child new foster parents or place them in an institution. After awhile such children try to make contact with their real families: usually it is the mother who secretly or openly

supports her children. The question remains: to whom should these young people adhere?

II. The educational models for migrants' children

Various European countries and Federal Germany's Laender are experimenting with different models of education. Three criteria may be used in order to develop a typology: a) the language of instruction, b) the extent of integration (segregation in relation to both children in the host country and other immigrants), and c) to what extent the goal of transitional classes is accomplished. Should preparatory classes be used to achieve integration in the school system of the host country or should they serve the building of biculturalism? Can transitional classes help to equip the children to enter the host country's school system?

Without going into detail about the results of these various models, three important points have to be underlined. 1) The number of migrant children who do not attend school at all or drop out is alarmingly high. 2) Among those attending school and showing a relatively successful adjustment, a serious disparity between two different skills in regard to the language itself may be observed. Migrant children are easily acquiring what J. Cummins (1980:26) defines as BICS, meaning Basic Interpersonal Communication Skills and Superficial Linguistic Fluency, but are encountering considerable difficulties in history, physics and biology, because they cannot easily master what J. Cummins calls CALP, Cognitive Academic Language Proficiency. These two dimensions of language proficiency can be empirically distinguished, and in a foreign language learning situation they can also become differentiated so that the acquisition of grade-appropriate foreign language CALP may take considerably longer than the acquisition of foreign language, BICS (1980:36). 3) Very serious dilemmas are arising from the teaching of the mother tongue. In Federal Germany there are three kinds of such instruction: a) 1-2 year national preparatory classes, b) national classes for several years duration, c) complete national classes. These alternatives are all physically segregated because the children in these classes are neither mixed with other migrant children nor with German children. The national classes are the ones which give the children the best possibilities to integrate into the school system of the home country, while the preparation classes for a transition to German classes alienate them most. Each option accelerates as a byproduct an identity crisis, because those children who grow up at home and at school in their own language, later are unable to follow

professional training and enter the labor market. With advancing age, their feeling of being an outcast increases. On the other hand, those youngsters who achieve a successful adjustment desire to belong only to the dominant culture, and by denying their own roots often come into open conflict with their parents.

The manifold problems arising from different educational models are considerably increased by two additional factors. The Turkish government, anxious to conserve the cultural ties of first and second generation migrants with their home country, has increasingly spread out its own network of Turkish teachers and supply of teaching material. At present approximately 500 Turkish teachers are carrying out their supplementary teaching in history, geography and Turkish literature in Europe. However, these courses—even when administered in official schools—are not a part of the official curriculum, thus not rated in the school certificate. The only advance in this regard has been the decision taken in some Laender to accept Turkish as the first compulsory foreign language. Since these courses are voluntary and usually only given on Saturdays or during the free hours within the week, the attendance of Turkish children is rather low. A 1980 survey reveals that only 34.3 percent of the Turkish students attended such courses (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1980:65). The participation in such classes depends largely on the motivation parents transmit to their children. Other problems, such as difficulty and expenses involved in attending courses given in a particular district of a large city, also play an important role. Finally, girls might not be able to go to these classes because of their duties toward small brothers and sisters or because of the rigid code of behavior their parents impose on them.

An important additional load imposed on migrant children is attendance of religious teaching and/or Koran courses. Along with Turkish teachers, the Turkish government has increasingly been sending religious functionaries—in 1982 a total of 197—to Europe. Among their other duties, they are commissioned to start Koran courses. However in addition to their activities, organized sects, such as the Süleymancıs represented by the Islamic Cultural Centers, have been spreading out to collect Turkish children and teach them the rudiments of the Koran. According the report of the Pious Foundations, the number of religious associations carrying out these functions in Europe does control approximately 700 mosques and praying rooms (Diyanetişleri 1983).

These additional educational activities deprive the children of almost all their available leisure time and force them to adopt a

three-dimensional role, a performance almost impossible to handle. These children, whose vocabulary is considerably limited both in their mother tongue as well as the host country language, are expected to behave at school like Europeans, and speak German/Dutch/Danish, etc. like their native peers. When these children attend Turkish cultural events they are expected to speak a faultless Turkish, and adopt the values of a Western-oriented, secular Turkey dedicated to the achievements of Turkey's national goals. Finally, when they participate in religious classes, little girls have to cover their heads (all children have to), memorize Arabic texts they don't understand, believe in the rules of the Sharia and behave like a good Moslem, ready for the Holy War, the *cihad.*

The sheer impossibility of the load these three contradicting roles impose on youngsters very often results in these children opting for the dominant culture, as reflected in this statement:

> I don't want to return. I am going here to school. I like my friends. Foreigners also come to our school. We also want to make friendship with them, but they don't speak German.
>
> Who are these foreigners?
>
> Yugoslavs, Turks, Greeks.
>
> Aren't you also Turkish?
>
> Yes, but I feel myself here at home. The Germans don't look at me as an "Auslander" [foreigner]! (Üstün 1975:80)

On an individual basis, the shouldering of this almost impossible task to synthesize three different cultures, not only encourages the emergence of a schizophrenic personality structure, but also produces a great amount of psychosomatic disease and increasing use of violence as a means of self-defense against a hostile environment. This is even true for those left behind. Aksoy and Doyran have observed that among the families where parents have migrated together and left their children to the care of relatives or neighbors, agressive and rebellious behavior as well as recurrent temper fits seem to be prevailing characteristics (1977:254-267).

However, it would be erroneous to generalize too much about the negative impact of migration. As C. Wilpert has tried to explain, the quality of the social network (or ethnic subculture) does influence the interpretation of the situation, the perception of legitimacy of marginality and provides learning and opportunity structures for alternative behavior. Wilpert found that migrant families even of one nationality are not all alike. Families differ with respect to the extent of fragmentation, role reversals and role flexibility resulting from the

type of migration and female employment, background characteristics and qualifications as well as social network abroad and in the home country (1980:243).

III. Upbringing and cultural background

Open discrepancy between the functions and values attached to social institutions of the home and host countries also creates sources of tension and conflict. One source of such conflicts is derived from the difference in regard to upbringing and the role and expectations of families toward their children. In a detailed way, Gans (1962:56f.) has depicted that in various Mediterranean subcultures, upbringing is adult-centered and not child-centered. Accordingly "youth" is not a clearly definable period; the transition from child to adult takes place at an earlier age. The parents do not consciously set out to "develop" the child into an adult. Also, the concept of leisure time means little. There are few things for the children to do by themselves. Instead they have their own role in the family—to "help" the parents. Play is secondary and is seen, not as a path to adulthood, but as a handicap. Wülfing, studying the upbringing of Turkish children, notes that upbringing is not an end in itself, but consists of keeping all danger away from the child. It is clearly a situation of overprotectiveness. However, play is considered to be an immature occupation. This attitude is one of the causes of learning difficulties among Turkish children; they have not been encouraged to develop manual skills, independence and exercise in early childhood (1978:122). A similar observation has been registered by Aysel Ekşi in a survey among university students, where within the setting of a self-evaluating scale, 46.3 percent of the respondents described their mothers of having been "overprotective;" fathers were evaluated up to 35.9 percent as "overprotective" (Ekşi 1982: 175–176).

This leads us to consider Bernstein's claim, that a shift is taking place in Western industrialized countries from "positional" to "personal" family systems. Accordingly, role patterns are less heavily emphasized, the accent in child-rearing falls more and more on the individual. All this relates to the language codes in upbringing, socially restricted language developing into elaborated language, in which one respectively does or does not know each other's fundamental assumptions. Bernstein relates language patterns to the structure of social relations. When a child learns to speak, he also learns the demands of his social structure (1971).

For the developing child, the social structure becomes his psychological reality. "Positional families" are characterized by restricted codes and the child's questions are answered in terms of hierarchies, sex roles, age and status seniority. Appeals to the child meant to regulate his behavior are made in these terms. Good and evil are learned in terms of the social structure. Authority is clearly defined and provides a guideline for behavior, a code that maintains the solidarity of the group. In families based on the "personal" system, we find no fixed role patterns and answers to the child's questions and verbally manipulated feelings, rather than authority or discipline. Accordingly, values change. In a *positional* control system, the principal virtues are piety, sense of honor, and respect for roles. In a *personal* family system, virtues are integrity, naturalness, and personal success. Consequently, in positional families feelings of "shame" (*ayıp*) are evoked, while in personal families "guilt feelings" are more prevalent.

The discrepancy between these two opposed ways of upbringing and value system also explains the importance of the in-group in contrast to the out-group. Even where the family does not live together, its members still remain in close contact. In addition the various networks which operate within the in-group also exercise a considerable amount of control. Ulla-Britt Engelbrektsson has described in a very detailed way the impact of the networks operating in Sweden in controlling in two different ways the migrants that came from Alihan and Yeniköy, two small villages from Konya. As she points out, "the emigration processes from these two communities cannot be understood without prior understanding of the local social contexts from which they have emerged" (1978:299).

Accordingly, in such families, the men and older members have to "protect and provide for" the women and younger members in return. In case women are permitted to work, their leisure time activity again is subject to strict rules. This attitude is evaluated by the outsider as encouragement to submissiveness and passivity. For the insider this mode of behavior is simply the fulfillment of role expectation. Again, in this structural set-up, social support and control is continued and this strengthens the feeling of belonging. For the outsider this constitutes interference and lack of privacy.

These questions bring us once more to the problem of identity and roles (Elwert 1982:729). When migrants, both adults and children, belonging to a strongly-knit group are confronted with a new, unknown situation, they have to incorporate many "roles" into their "personality." In such cases their point of reference will again be the

question: is his/her behavior suitable for the group? Thus any action bringing "shame" to the group will be avoided, even if a particular situation might be a desirable goal for the out-group. Whereas at home, ideas such as honor, family and national pride are inculcated by means of restricted language codes and positional control systems, at school the system is oriented toward the individual and a wide range of codes are used to achieve ends such as success and happiness.

In concordance with Vlachos, Turkish migrants along with Greek migrants are facing two major cultural conflicts: a) a generation conflict and b) conflicts within the individual. The generation conflict is an expression of inadequate social integration. In the second generation, it is mainly conflict within the individual that occurs, characterized by an ambivalent attitude, both to one's own community and to the host country. The social position of the migrant family is often characterized by a low income, the father's unpleasant, dirty job, poor housing. In addition, migrant children are often teased by other children of the same age on account of the cultural differences between them. It must also be remembered that the child is much more vulnerable and sensitive in cognitive terms to insults or supposed insults. Discrimination is sometimes real, sometimes based on false perceptions, but it is felt all the more strongly by a child with feelings of insecurity, who has no resistance in the form of a positive self-image.

Turkish literature reveals so many forms reflecting the deep frustrations which Turkish migrant children undergo daily: they cannot play with their classmates because "blondes" don't like to kick the ball with the "black-haired"; mothers of blonde children do not permit their children to bring dark-haired friends home; they are not admitted to sports grounds, etc.

IV. Re-Turkization

A very important process dealing with the re-interpretation of cultural elements in order to overcome discrimination, frustration and segregation has been defined by G. Elwert as "re-turkisation." According to Elwert, re-turkisation is not a genuine import of native cultural elements, but a process that stems from a double breaking up of rural frames of reference.

In Federal Germany, where the presence of Turks has become visible and measurable in the city picture by the prevailing sight of women wearing headscarfs, trousers topped by dresses and knitted

jackets, walking behind their men, young boys and girls wearing the Koran around their neck, hurrying to Koran courses and alike, the impression of public opinion is that these foreigners have intruded into their society by trying to implant rules and behavior codes of typical agrarian societies. This impression gets reinforced by the faithful adherence to regular mosque prayers, display of wall rugs at home with religious subjects, a stubborn insistence on Islamic food rules, the isolation of women in their homes, the overemphasizing of *gurur* (pride), etc. In reality, however, this interpretation is not quite correct. In Anatolia, though women indeed are performing certain tasks both at home and in the fields, they are not separated from the men during the working process. Certainly, in given villages with growing market-oriented production and wage work in nearby towns, a growing segregation between men and women may be observed. But even in these settings, this segregation is not strictly applied, otherwise the whole production system would collapse.

What actually happens is that for a significant number of migrants, the migratory process has been realized in two steps. They first tried to establish themselves in Turkey's metropolitan areas, namely its largest cities. This attempt, very often accompanied by a long period of unemployment, led to a state of rootlessness. With it came a significant amount of status loss and meaninglessness. These conditions led those newcomers to compensate their feelings of frustration by adopting certain rituals, such as norms for dressing, daily prayer, prohibition of certain drinks and food. One can also observe among this group strong affiliation to cliques in certain streets, regular visits to politically-oriented coffee houses. Thus, during the first phase of inner-migration, the newcomers to the city adopt a subculture, heavily tinted with a compensatory character. It can be interpreted as a reaction to the breakdown of their original identity.

Once these migrants achieve the second phase of displacement by migrating abroad, their social isolation is even more accentuated. Their only system of defense is to use their political identification and understanding of Islam to overcome the overwhelming rootlessness with which they are confronted. But it would be erroneous to interpret this as a return to the roots of Turkish culture; in reality this set of values and behavior code is the product of an urban subculture, so to speak, invented by the de-peasantized former inhabitants of Turkey's squatter houses.

As soon as these migrants move abroad, the diffuse threats they are exposed to lead them to take very broad protective measures.

This explains why Turkish women are cut off from German women. Their field of action is reduced to going shopping in the company of their children and/or husbands. Such a state of "slavery" for women is not the typical life they lead in rural Turkey. Certainly, village life in Turkey is based on a strict sex role division, but women are never separated from their peers in the village; on the contrary, the world of women assures them relative freedom and even autonomy.

G. Elwert reports, on the basis of personal observation, that a number of Turkish women who arrived dressed in skirts or pants, shifted over after a couple of years to the typical Turkish dress abroad—meaning headscarf, wide pants under the dress—in order to demonstrate their belongingness and identity to the in-group. They admitted that in Ankara or Istanbul they would reject this way of dressing by qualifying it as reactionary and conservative. However, they underlined that the manifold deprivations and discriminations they encountered abroad, forced them to adhere symbolically to their in-group. It is a mode of behavior that was also observed during the war of liberation in Algeria and during the rebellion against the Shah's regime in Iran, when emancipated women adopted the traditional dresses/veils in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the government.

Thus, identity crises might from time to time lead to a complete assimilation of the powerful culture or on the contrary to a voluntary adoption.

Conclusion

As it approaches the second millenium, Europe is becoming increasingly an agglomeration of multicultural societies. What is emerging are people with hyphenated identities. The ramifications of this pluralism are to be found not only in the psycho-social identity of individuals, but also in the patterns of social organization in the broader society. It appears that, in spite of growing signs of racism and other forms of discrimination, the guestworkers in Europe (among them the two million Turks) will stay on, especially the second generation and the coming third one. The imponderable is whether farsighted and humane social policies will be developed in order to facilitate their integration.

G. Elwert, a German social scientist, suggests that in order to secure migrants a higher degree of self-confidence and assertiveness, cultural identity and the possibility to enable them to engage in action related to daily needs, a new form of community living has to be developed. Opportunity for migrant workers to live in spacious,

closely-related areas could assure them an "institutional completeness," which would provide for a greater degree of psychological security. It also would open the way to the formation of pressure groups, which again leads to a democratic solution for the political participation of minorities. Even if the migrants as aliens are not given any political rights, they can begin to govern through their ethnicity.

The search for new solutions which could secure a healthier, happier and safer way of life for the undesired citizens of Europe and their children, no doubt depends largely on the conceptualization of human rights and democratic rights the governing élites are ready to grant.

Those who are bound to overcome serious problems of identity and belongingness, the representatives of the second and third generation, are living in an environment threatened by unemployment, racism and fear of nuclear war. They appear to lead a marginal life, remaining silent. Some people call them the "lost generation." When a Turkish child heard this definition, he riposted in anger, "We are not lost, we only have not been able to raise our voices!" Let's hope they may do it constructively and peacefully.

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