Chapter 10

# TURKISH MIGRATION TO EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

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Migration is a universal phenomenon. In the past there were four major types of human migration: migration forced by poor geographic or climatic conditions; migration owing to conquest; group migration for sociological reasons; and migration for religious reasons. Today, however, migration has acquired a new character. Franklin D. Scott (1968:2-3) correctly observes that the day of individually motivated, uncontrolled international migrations has passed; "laissez-faire" no longer regulates large-scale migratory movements. The change is evident both in the case of migration to Europe over the past quarter century and of migration within Middle Eastern countries during the last decade. Instead of a shift of populations, we are now facing an increasingly important shift of manpower.

The traditional role of Europe as a source of settlers for North and South America, Australia, and southern Africa dramatically and systematically changed in the decade that followed the establishment of the European Economic Community—EEC (Abadan-Unat 1976:2). Through the Treaty of Rome (1957) legal and institutional arrangements were established to encourage the intra-European movement of labor. Northwestern Europe quickly became a magnet for immigrants from the less developed regions of the EEC and the Mediterranean. Five countries—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany), France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland—attracted the majority of these new immigrants. On a smaller scale Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Austria also became targets for job-seekers from Mediterranean countries.

In a closer examination of what has come to be called the "European South"—i.e., the less developed countries encircling the Mediterranean—a basic distinction has to be made. Marios Nikolinakos (1973) classifies the region into three groups: (1) The countries of

southern Europe proper (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece); (2) Turkey and Yugoslavia—countries which emerged in the twentieth century through the liquidation or dismantling of empires; (3) Countries which experienced some kind of European colonialism: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Libya (pp. 142-43). A number of the countries from the second and third groups, such as Turkey and the countries of the Maghreb, have organized large-scale migration not only to northern Europe, but also to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East.

In this chapter we shall analyze Turkish migration in an effort to evaluate the pattern and effects of migration from the European South on the social structure of both sending and host countries, as well as the role of social legislation on both sides. It should be emphasized that while rapidly increasing external migration has forced legislatures to enact some new laws, existing rules and regulations have also contributed to migratory trends. Thus the causal role of law appears to rest upon interdependence, in spite of the fact that external migration is heavily subjected to a dependence relationship. (Concrete examples will be presented below.)

## TURKISH MIGRATION TO EUROPE

In present-day Turkey migration has become a commonly accepted alternative for employment, ranging from the "brain drain" to the export of excess manpower to the encouragement of entrepreneurship to settling abroad, but this practice has a very short history. Legally, free exit started with the adoption of the Constitution of 1961, whereby leaving or entering the country became a fundamental right and freedom (Abadan-Unat 1976:14). By 1984, 2,404,031 Turkish citizens had taken up permanent residence in five continents, showing the rapidity with which this new type of lifestyle has been adopted. (See Table 1 for a distribution of Turkish migrants by host country; breakdown figures by years, sex of workers, and children in selected host countries are presented in Tables 2-4.) Rapid migration becomes even more significant if one considers that at the beginning employment abroad—especially in West Germany—was principally considered as a form of twelve-month apprenticeship based on a system of rotation (i.e., short-term recruitment).

Turkish migration to Europe, beginning in the late 1950s, has undergone five major phases, which we shall discuss below.

Table 1

DISTRIBUTION OF TURKISH MIGRANTS BY HOST COUNTRY: MAY 1984

| Host Country | Workers | Workers' Children | Total Citizens Abroad |
|---|---|---|---|
| *EEC countries* | | | |
| West Germany | 542,512 | 623,700 (0-18 years) | 1,552,328 |
| France | 64,070 | 61,610 (0-16 years) | 144,790 |
| Netherlands | 55,000 | 74,633 (0-19 years) | 154,201 |
| Belgium | 25,000 | 29,579 (0-14 years) | 63,587 |
| England | 11,648 | 4,272 (0-18 years) | 28,480 |
| Denmark | 8,496 | 7,952 (0-18 years) | 17,240 |
| *Subtotal* | 706,726 | 801,746 | 1,960,626 |
| *Non-EEC countries* | | | |
| Austria | 27,733 | 24,979 (0-18 years) | 75,000 |
| Switzerland | 24,751 | 19,638 (0-18 years) | 48,485 |
| Sweden | 10,000 | 9,974 (0-19 years) | 20,900 |
| Norway | 1,400 | 1,346 (0-19 years) | 3,086 |
| *Subtotal* | 63,884 | 55,937 | 147,471 |
| *Subtotal, all European countries* | 770,610 | 857,683 | 2,108,097 |
| Australia | 20,000 | N.A. | 60,000 |
| *North Africa and Middle East* | | | |
| Libya | 75,500 | 2,500 (0-18 years) | 80,000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 120,000 | 1,000 (0-18 years) | 126,000 |
| Iraq | 9,144 | 90 | 9,284 |
| Jordan | 8,000 | N.A. | 8,000 |
| Lebanon | 7,000 | N.A. | 7,000 |
| Kuwait | 3,000 | – | 3,000 |
| Syria | 230 | N.A. | – |
| United Arab Emirates (UAE) | 60 | N.A. | 150 |
| *Subtotal* | 222,934 | | 233,434 |
| Other countries | 2,000 | N.A. | 2,500 |
| *Total* | 1,015,544 | | 2,404,031 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1984b:150, table 1.

Table 2

NUMBER OF WORKERS SENT ABROAD THROUGH TURKISH EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, 1961-80

| Host Country | 1961-73 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| West Germany | 648,029 | 1,228 | 640 | 2,101 | 2,413 | 1,333 | 933 | 764 |
| France | 45,366 | 10,577 | 25 | 6 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 21 |
| Austria | 34,461 | 2,501 | 226 | 672 | 583 | 54 | 23 | 944 |
| Netherlands | 23,359 | 1,503 | 32 | 98 | 83 | 48 | 40 | 32 |
| Belgium | 15,309 | 555 | 59 | 72 | 45 | 41 | 27 | 35 |
| Switzerland | 6,360 | 770 | 229 | 281 | 246 | 326 | 406 | 536 |
| Libya | 664 | 1,015 | 2,121 | 4,098 | 8,582 | 7,726 | 9,825 | 15,090 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4 | — | 251 | 1,832 | 4,722 | 5,769 | 8,522 | 5,643 |
| Australia | 4,668 | 1,133 | 491 | 339 | 542 | 549 | 407 | 409 |
| Other | 12,069 | 924 | 435 | 1,059 | 1,853 | 2,993 | 3,436 | 5,029 |
| *Total* | 790,289 | 20,206 | 4,509 | 10,558 | 19,084 | 18,852 | 23,630 | 28,503 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982.

Table 3

TURKISH MIGRANT WORKERS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN HOST COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO SEX, 1980

| Host Country | Men | Women | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| West Germany | 431,623 | 159,000 | 590,623 |
| Netherlands | 36,126 | 11,200 | 47,326 |
| Austria | 21,702 | 8,428 | 30,130 |
| Switzerland | 12,992 | 7,127 | 20,119 |
| *Total* | 502,443 | 185,755 | 688,198 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982.

Table 4

TURKISH WORKERS' CHILDREN BY HOST COUNTRY AND AGE, 1980

| | Age of Children | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Host Country | 0-6 Years | 7-18 Years | Total | Percent of Migrant Children |
| West Germany | 201,500 | 382,900 | 584,400 | 78.8% |
| Netherlands | 16,465 | 20,555 | 37,000 | 5.0 |
| France | 14,257 | 17,820 | 32,027 | 4.3 |
| Belgium | 12,478 | 17,780 | 30,258 | 4.1 |
| Austria | 7,796 | 9,743 | 17,539 | 2.4 |
| Switzerland | 6,047 | 7,557 | 13,604 | 1.8 |
| Sweden | 3,636 | 4,545 | 8,181 | 1.1 |
| Denmark | 2,351 | 2,747 | 5,098 | 0.7 |
| Saudi Arabia | 223 | 277 | 500 | — |
| Libya | 400 | 500 | 900 | 0.1 |
| Australia | 4,445 | 5,555 | 10,000 | 1.4 |
| Other | 889 | 1,111 | 2,000 | 0.3 |
| *Total* | 270,487 | 471,090 | 741,507 | 100.0 |

*Source:* OECD 1981:127.

## PHASE 1: EXPERIMENTAL MIGRATION; RECRUITMENT BY NOMINATION (1956-61)

This first phase is characterized by the recruitment efforts of private businessmen and (later) semi-official labor-recruiting institutes, predominantly in West Germany. An official effort came in 1956 from the Institute of World Economy of the University of Kiel, which requested that the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry send volunteer migrants who needed vocational training. These early-comers were mostly recruited by shipbuilding companies in Hamburg, Bremen, and Kiel. Having been solicited on a private basis by receiving personally addressed letters of invitation (the legal form of nominated recruitment)—mostly through the good services of German spouses of well-to-do Turkish businessmen in Istanbul—these people were able to bring their families with them, and after the completion of their apprenticeship, instead of returning home, settle down for good. Indeed these skilled workers preferred to stay, putting an end to an idea launched in Hamburg by the Chamber of Commerce: "The middle class helps the middle class." It had been thought that by promoting time-bound technical training on the spot for labor exchange and sending skilled migrant manpower home, the growth of industrialism could be promoted in the country of origin. Facts did not confirm this premature assumption (Abadan-Unat 1964:121, table 108).

## PHASE 2: UNCONTROLLED EXPANSION; GOVERNMENTAL MEDIATION; OBLIGATORY SINGLE EMIGRATION (1961-72)

External migration prior to 1961 remained confined to individuals or small groups, but the adoption of Turkey's first Five-Year Development Plan (1962-67) and the building of the Berlin Wall (which cut off the labor supply from East Germany) drastically changed the situation. Viewing existing domestic employment possibilities realistically, the first five-year plan states that "The export of excess, unskilled labor to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment" (Turkey 1963:456). This new outlook and the growing needs of the West German labor market led to an explosion in emigration. While in 1960 only 2,700 workers had left Turkey, the number rose to 27,500 in 1963 and reached the dramatic high point with 615,827 in 1973 (Abadan-Unat 1976:7, table 1).

During this phase external migration proceeded mostly in two ways. The most common was a system called "anonymous recruitment," according to which employers seeking Turkish workers applied to the authorities in their own countries for the specific number of recruits they required. Their requests would be transferred to the Turkish Employment Service, which, in collaboration with the German Recruitment Bureau in Istanbul, would then choose a sufficient number of applicants from waiting lists. In order to avoid favoritism toward metropolitan areas with long waiting lists and to permit less developed areas to share the benefits of external migration, available jobs were distributed from the headquarters of the Employment Service all over the country. When waiting lists grew longer, priority was given to prospective migrants from the least developed regions of Turkey, to members of Village Development Cooperatives (see below), and to inhabitants of officially designated "disaster areas"—i.e., regions affected by earthquakes, droughts, plant diseases, etc.

The second method of migration during this phase was known as "nominated recruitment." An employer abroad would file an application for a specific individual. The Employment Service in Turkey would then arrange for his dispatch as an officially recognized migrant, whether or not his name already appeared on the waiting list. Normally nominated recruits depended on a network of friends or relations already established abroad who could locate vacancies in nearby workplaces and arrange with the employers to nominate them.

This unprecedented expansion of migrant workers abroad forced Turkey (as well as other Mediterranean countries) to sign bilateral agreements with host countries. Accordingly in 1961 Turkey signed its first bilateral agreement with West Germany, followed in 1964 by agreements with Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In 1965 it signed a bilateral agreement with France, and in 1967 with Sweden (Onulduran and van Renselaar 1976:29-30). All these agreements have removed the implementation of migration from the initiative of the individual and transferred it to the appropriate government bureaucracies of the concerned countries. Thus recruitment became a monopoly to be exercised only by the Turkish Employment Service and its counterpart in a host country. All the agreements covered the terms and procedures for final selection of migrants (including a rigorous health examination), transportation costs, and cases of workers who desired or were compelled to return before their contracts expired.

The bilateral agreements also contributed to the creation of auxiliary organizations aimed at facilitating the adjustment of foreign workers to their new home and work environments. Thus in West Germany each ethnic group was assisted by a social welfare organization—mostly church organizations in the case of Catholic or Protestant migrants. For Turks the Social Democratic party, through a branch organization called Arbeiterwohlfahrt, offered Türk-Danış, a team of Germans and Turks employed solely to solve the personal grievances, legal requests, and issues pertaining to Turks in West Germany. One could conclude, as does Rist (1978:111), that from this phase on, foreign workers were in West Germany as the result of policies made at the highest levels of the German government.

From the Turkish end, the most important government policy during this phase was the introduction of a special rate of exchange available only to holders of "workers' passports." The policy had two purposes: to prevent a further growth of a permanent black market, and to induce migrant workers to send more of their savings home.

Finally, in this period cultural and social associations for migrant workers began to emerge in the host countries. Viewed by some Turkish workers as a kind of compensation for trade union activities, these associations, in line with the pluralistic structure of the host country, obtained important subsidies. In 1963 West Germany had 20 such associations; by 1974 there were 112 in West Germany and 156 in all of Western Europe (Abadan-Unat 1979:22). As of 1980 there were 573 in West Germany and 117 in the rest of Western Europe (see Table 5).

During this phase little attention was devoted to the problem of how to bring the families of migrant workers to join them in the host country, even though the notion of returning home after one year of work abroad had been quickly abandoned. Most migrants were men who went abroad alone, leaving their families behind. A more important discussion which predominated at this time concerned the ghetto-like, mostly male communities of workers in host countries, as well as the compulsory, regimented lifestyle which was imposed on workers' dormitories set up by the employers.

The fast tempo of recruitment suddenly slowed down during the recession of 1966-67, but this did not last. In spite of the discharge in 1966 of approximately 70,000 Turkish workers in West Germany, very few returned to their home country. Those who were not able to find a job in another part of West Germany or in a country

Table 5

DISTRIBUTION OF TURKISH RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ASSOCIATIONS BY HOST COUNTRY, 1980

| Host Country | Religious Associations | Social Associations |
|---|---|---|
| West Germany | 312 | 261 |
| Netherlands | 24 | 15 |
| France[a] | 19 | 30 |
| Belgium | 14 | 29 |
| Austria | 7 | 15 |
| Switzerland | 7 | 31 |
| Denmark[b] | 3 | 6 |
| Sweden | — | 17 |
| *Total* | 386 | 404 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1984a: 34, table 14.

[a]Figures for Strasbourg and Marseilles only.

[b]Figures are for 1979.

neighboring their new home country (such as the Netherlands and Belgium) began to enquire about unemployment insurance. Thus the abrupt economic crisis made Turkish workers aware of the scope and uses of social legislation. It also led to a heated debate about the economic and social role of the foreign labor class as a "conjunctural buffer" (*Konjunkturpuffer*)—in other words, a reserve labor army. At this point special units for migrant workers were established in the European national trade unions.

## PHASE 3: CONSOLIDATION AND REDEFINITION OF GOALS IN REGARD TO EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS AND LEGITIMATION OF ILLEGAL (TOURIST) MIGRANTS (1972-75)

This phase reflects major developments in both host and home countries. By 1973 the host countries had slowly realized that the "temporary" employment of foreign manpower was questionable.

Strongly pressured by their respective national trade unions, the host countries started to sign with Turkey a series of social security agreements providing coverage to migrant workers for preventive health, illness, accidents and work-related diseases, unemployment, retirement, maternity, child allowances, death and permanent injury, and aid to survivors.

From 1973, however, world economic events changed the manner in which foreign workers came to be viewed in West Germany. The oil embargo of 1973-74, a subsequent fourfold increase in the price of crude oil, a recession, and the unemployment of more than one million German workers resulted in the following policies: no new foreign workers were to be allowed to come; those that were already in the country could either continue to work or leave the labor force permanently. The economic situation led to a sharp polarization of opinion in regard to migratory policies. On one side the German employers association, the Bund der Deutschen Arbeitgeber (BDA), and communal organizations, concerned that German infrastructures (hospitals, schools, social services) were overburdened, began to support the principle of "rotation" (i.e., short-term recruitment). On the other side, the major workers' organization, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DBG—the German Federation of Trade Unions), anxious that wage levels would be lowered if low-paid job categories were permitted for foreign labor and wishing to oppose further illegal immigration, started after 1968 to attack the discriminatory Alien Act of 1965 and to promote the principle of "full integration" (Zur Reform der Auslaenderpolitik 1973; Ahrendt 1973:689-93).

The discussions which ensued led to an important modification of the official labor policies of West Germany. Government decisions of 6 June 1973 were made public by the Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs. According to these decisions, the ultimate goal of employing foreign labor was to achieve a harmony between the needs for continuity in production and a full integration of foreign manpower into society. Thus the following drastic measures were made possible: (a) A German worker had the option of taking over a position held by a foreign worker when the latter's labor permit expired; (b) Work permits for family members who came to Germany after 30 November 1974 could be refused; (c) The recruitment of each new foreign worker would depend upon the availability of adequate and decent housing facilities, to be provided by employers in conformity with standards established in April 1974; (d) The permission

for newcomers to settle in already heavily concentrated regions would depend on the absorption capacity of the existing social structure; (e) Employers would have to pay DM 1,000 for each non-EEC worker—an increase of DM 700 over the old figure; (f) Any obligatory or coercive measures tending to abruptly terminate the prevailing employment arrangements of foreign labor were to be rejected on "social and humanistic" grounds. These measures deeply affected the migratory flow. While in 1973, 103,753 new workers came from Turkey to West Germany, in 1975 only 640 received a first-time German labor permit (Rist 1978:113).

These drastic measures also explain a sudden swell of illegal migrants. Already in 1970-71 the waiting list in Turkey stood at over one million. Prospective migrants who were not willing to wait in vain for six or seven years sought to avoid a seemingly endless delay by emigrating unofficially. With limited exceptions, a Turkish citizen is entitled to apply for a tourist passport valid for three, six, or twelve months. Particularly in the 1970s unofficial migrants hoped to slip into a country of destination as "tourists" and find jobs with employers willing to turn a blind eye to the lack of a work permit. Sometimes unofficial migrants crossed frontiers over rarely frequented mountain paths to evade control. Another popular channel was to undertake a bus trip through socialist countries (Bulgaria, Rumania, East Germany), enter East Germany in East Berlin, and take a subway heading to West Berlin. (This channel has been closed.)

Inevitably unscrupulous brokers established themselves. For a hefty fee they would undertake to shepherd clandestine migrants to their destination. Of course unofficial migrants constantly face problems: they can always be deported, and they are wide open to exploitation. A case study reflects the ordeal such "tourist" migrants have experienced. A returnee relates the following:

> I applied to the Employer Service in Yozgat in 1965, but was never called. I waited 3 years and in 1968 decided to go as a tourist. I borrowed 4,000 TL [Turkish lira] with 25 dönüm as a guarantee.*
>
> We went with a bus from Istanbul. In Italy we crossed the Italian-Austrian border at night through the forest with an Italian guide. We were 15 then and everyone had to pay 900 TL to that guide.
>
> In Austria I found work for 1,000 schillings a month. The farmer liked me much but the payment was too low. After two months we found work in a lumber factory; this time we were paid 500

*One dönüm is approximately one acre.

sch. each. I worked two and a half years in that factory for 4,000 schillings a month. There were 8 workers from my village in that area then.

Later all the workers from the village passed from Austria to Germany. There was a Turk who "organized" these nominated calls to Germany for a payment of 1,000 schillings. I did not know the language and they profited from the situation.

In Germany I got work in a big construction firm in Sigmar, where I worked 8 months. But the payment was low for the hard work I had to do. So I wrote a letter to my cousins in Munich; they found me work in the same firm where they worked. When I came there, there were 4 migrants from the village working in Munich.

After one and a half year's work in that firm I fell ill from hard work. I stayed some days in the hospital and found an easier job afterwards, which paid somewhat less. In 1974 I fell ill again, appendicitis. I went to the hospital, but they did not want to help me; they sent me home. I was very upset and decided to return to Turkey immediately. I had had enough! (Penninx and van Velzen 1976:184-86).

The same empirical survey from which this case study is taken revealed that out of a group of five hundred migrants, as many as 42.4 percent had originally gone abroad on a tourist passport (Penninx and van Velzen 1976:180). The higher earnings for unskilled workers in Western Europe still made the risks worthwhile for many migrants.

As the protection of illegal workers became urgent, some governments offered amnesty and issued the migrants official permits. Such amnesty has been granted by Belgium (in 1966 and 1974), some West German state governments (Hessen and the Palatinate in 1972), France in 1973, and Holland in 1975 (Hale 1978:43).

In the third phase both Turkey and the major host countries gained "consciousness" in regard to the manifold problems of foreign workers. As a result, much larger audiences were made aware of the problems in recent years. This awareness is partly reflected in the large number of articles published in the Turkish and European press, as well as the coverage by the mass media of labor shortages, foreign manpower, and its impact on social life. In addition this phase marks the beginning of the interaction of migration on the arts—particularly literature—both in Europe and at home. A short example comes from Nevzat Üstün, a writer living in West Germany:

> What the Germans are expecting is totally opposed to existence in contemporary civilization. They demand only additional manpower. . . . Workers will come, sweep the streets, build the houses, weld the electric fixtures, but will not be visible. . . . They are not supposed to live in houses, to go to parks, to eat, to make love. . . . If they could, they would send all foreigners home after five o'clock in the afternoon and bring them back at five o'clock in the morning!

### PHASE 4: SETTLING ABROAD FOR INDEFINITE PERIODS; MIXED MARRIAGES; FAMILY MIGRATION; EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS (1975-78)

This period reflected an ambivalence among many migrant workers. On the one hand, most of them wanted to cling to the illusion that they would return home and realize their dreams; on the other, the persistent unemployment at home, along with growing violence and political instability, induced a significant number of them to postpone their return at least until they retired. Thus they began to bring their families, and united families became the prevailing pattern. This trend was indirectly or inadvertently reinforced by legislation in the host country. An important step in this direction was a decision not to grant work permits to spouses and children who entered West Germany after December 1974. The most blatant example of indirect consequences comes from a new child allowance policy. Prior to 1 January 1975 a taxpayer could deduct child support from his gross income (as in the United States). In 1973, 60.5 percent of all child allowances—i.e., DM 357 million—had been paid for 515,161 Turkish children left in the home country. With the reforms, the deductions were eliminated and a new family allowance was instigated. Child allowances were now available to all children in the country at a uniform rate and payable regardless of parent income; the idemnity was adjusted to the cost of living. Lower allowances were paid to migrant workers whose children were outside of West Germany. The different schedules are shown in Table 6.

This child allowance legislation affected Turkish workers most, for despite the trend toward united families, they still had the highest proportion of married workers (86 percent) but the lowest proportion of united families—only 46 percent. As a result of the legislation, even more workers brought their families. This situation induced the

Table 6

MONTHLY CHILD ALLOWANCES IN WEST GERMANY BEFORE AND AFTER 1975
*(DM)*

| Number of Children | Allowance for German and Foreign Children Irrespective of Residence, 1964-74 | Allowance for Turkish Children Residing Outside West Germany after 1975 | Allowance for German and Foreign Children Residing in West Germany from 1975 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | – | 10 | 50 |
| 2 | 25 | 25 | 70 |
| 3 | 50 | 60 | 120 |
| 4 | 60 | 60 | 120 |
| 5 | 70 | 70 | 120 |

*Source:* Abadan-Unat 1976:35.

German lawmakers to change their policies in order to discourage foreign workers from bringing their families. Regulations were enacted in late 1975 to provide that foreign workers whose children remained in the home country would receive a different child allowance, on the assumption that the foreign workers would not bring their children to West Germany due to the high cost of living (Abadan-Unat 1976: 34-35; see also Rist 1978:85). However, Turkish migrants were not deterred from bringing their families—even if they had to pay a surcharge to be with their families (which the native workers did not). Their attitude is easy to understand: child allowances were paid in cash, while tax deductions could be obtained only after careful accounting. Thus after 1975 airplanes loaded with as many as fifty young children would arrive in West Germany. This was the period of the "imported baby boom." Moreover, the child allowance policy also seriously affected the fertility pattern of migrants. In 1984 Turks had a fertility rate of 3.5 per 1,000 women of reproductive age—compared to 1.3 for the West Germans. Between 1974 and 1980 the number of Turkish children under the age of 16 living in West Germany increased 129.8 percent; the increase for 1978-79 alone was 15.7 percent. In 1980, 40 percent of the Turkish migrant population

of West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway was under 18 years old.* The rapid increase in the migrant population under 18 has amplified the existing social problems. Ignorance of the host country's language, difficulties in adapting to a different society, and the impossibility of benefiting from an educational system fraught with complications only reinforced segregation and the migrants' preference for ghetto life.

The strong desire of migrants to remain in West Germany led to a noticeable increase in mixed marriages after 1973. Article 6 of the German Constitution states that marriages are to enjoy special protections—most notably the protection from interference by the state. While mixed marriages were one of the desired consequences of full integration, in West Germany there has been much substantial evidence that they were performed only for a migrant to obtain a permanent residence permit. To prevent the misuse of this institution the German civil law was changed. Prior to 1973 the civil law (section 13.54) granted a husband the sole right to determine where his family was to live; this rule obviously prevented deportations. After 1973 the right was given to both partners. However, in order to deport the foreign spouse of a mixed marriage, specific and important reasons based upon evidence had to be presented in an open hearing. A continued increase in mixed marriages is reflected in the most recent statistics: in 1979 there were 25,023 marriages between Germans and foreign nationals (16,246 German women married foreign men)—an increase over 1978 of 7.2 percent (*Der Spiegel* 1982).† In addition to the increase in mixed marriages, there was an increase in children born out of wedlock.

Migrant workers were also affected by large-scale legislative measures to decongest cities with heavy foreign populations. Between 1975 and 1977 cities with more than 6 percent foreigners in their total population could apply to their state government to be designated "overburdened settlement areas." In consequence a ban would be placed on further foreign settlement. As of 1977 five of the largest cities in West Germany—Cologne, Frankfurt, Hannover, Munich, and

*The figures for West Germany were as follows: 0-6 years—201,500 (13.8 percent); 7-10 years—142,600 (9.8 percent), 11-15 years—146,100 (10.0 percent); 16-18 years—94,200 (6.4 percent) (Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:19).

†According to *Der Spiegel* (1982), there were 526 marriages between Turks and Germans in 1965, 586 in 1970, 964 in 1975, and 3,765 in 1980. (See also OECD 1981:43.)

West Berlin—had obtained such bans.* By seeking to control the urban foreign populations, the various city and state governments aimed at keeping down the "social costs" of migrants. However, conflicting interests arose from these measures, and the policy was abandoned (*Bildung und Wissenschaft* 1/2:10).

In this phase the problems connected with providing a satisfactory education to the children of Turkish migrants became more severe. Although equality of educational opportunities has been greatly stressed in West Germany, the federal system applied many alternative models which resulted in a bewildering array of segregated or integrated classes. Confused by the complicated requirements of various school systems, many parents decided to take their children out of school after five years—the compulsory schooling period in Turkey; it differs substantially from that of West Germany, where school attendance until the age of 16 is compulsory. In addition to the bewildering school system in West Germany, some parents sent their children to privately supported Koran schools for religious education on Saturdays and Sundays, forcing upon the children totally opposite pedagogical methods. The discrepancy lies in the fact that the regular West German schools emphasize creative thinking and mental curiosity, while Islamic religious teaching relies totally upon memorizing texts in Arabic which the children do not understand. Thus the migrants' offspring had to cope not only with the most important obstacle—the language barrier—but also with a clash of cultural values.

As Rist (1978:201) observes, the German school system has traditionally been selective, elitist, and rigid. It has effectively excluded some 90 percent of its students from the opportunity for a university education. The situation bears particularly on foreign children. So far 60 percent of the children of foreign workers have not completed any of the three alternatives for secondary education (Bodenbender 1976:9). Despite measures to facilitate vocational training, only 18 percent of Turkish youngsters between the ages of

*In West Germany as a whole there was a foreign population of 6.4 percent in 1977. For individual cities the proportions were as follows: Frankfurt—19.4 percent; Stuttgart—16.3 percent; Munich—15.8 percent; Cologne—12.6 percent; Düsseldorf—12.5 percent; West Berlin—9.5 percent; Hamburg—7.4 percent. According to *Der Spiegel* (1982), the proportions in 1981 were as follows: Frankfurt—23.2 percent; Stuttgart—18.3 percent; Munich—17.3 percent; Cologne—15.2 percent; West Berlin—12.0 percent; Hamburg—9.9 percent.

15 and 21 attended vocational schools in 1979 (Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:109; see also Hecker 1980:51).

In addition to the major difficulty—an insufficient knowledge of German—Turkish children face the following problems:

(a) The tendency in some *Laender* (states) to keep the children out of regular German schools and segregate them in separate classes (the Bavarian model);

(b) The decision on who should teach the children their mother tongue;

(c) The total integration model, in which the mother tongue is not taught, thus alienating the children from their home and parents (the Berlin model);

(d) The emphasis upon continual evaluation of students.

Conflicts also arise between the methods of teaching by two different groups of Turkish teachers, one appointed by the Turkish National Education Ministry and the other recruited by German school authorities and placed on the German payroll (Abadan-Unat 1975:314-16). Furthermore, some Turkish parents discriminate against their eldest daughters, using them as "mother substitutes." As a result, the girls' school attendance is poor or they drop out entirely. This situation, which in brief can be described as the cultivation of "bilingual illiteracy," requires fast and effective policy correctives (Boos-Nünning et al. 1976).

## PHASE 5: EXCESSIVE ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITIES: INCREASED REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM; INTRODUCTION OF VISA REQUIREMENTS; ENCOURAGEMENT OF INTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION (1978- )

Until September 1980—when there was a military intervention in Turkey—the political turmoil shaking the foundations of the country's civil society created a boomerang effect in the form of excessive associational activities and political polarization among migrant workers in host countries. In the early 1960s Turkish workers' associations were mainly supported by the host country and served on a limited scale as surrogate trade unions and supportive networks among Turks. Their number and functions grew very rapidly. (The distribution of associations was presented in Table 5.)

Gradually these associations became involved in ideological controversies. Both leftist oriented, internationally linked ones and fanatically rightist religious associations started to recruit members in large cities and became the satellites of extremist political parties in the home country. Thus on the one hand, as early as 1973 the fascist-leaning National Action Party had established six autonomous sections in Berlin, Hannover, Cologne, Mannheim, Munich, and Stuttgart which had militia-like commandos called the Gray Wolves. Following sharp criticism in the Bundestag, these sections were closed down in November 1976. Similarly ultra-conservative religious associations not only supported the National Salvation Party at home, but also established private schools in all major urban centers in which a blend of missionary zeal and ideological warfare was propounded (Abadan-Unat 1979:23). After the military intervention of 1980 some of these extremist associations engaged in European-wide hunger strikes, sharply condemning the incumbent governments, and thus becoming the mouthpieces for prosecuted or escaped Turkish political activists. Subsidies were still being granted by the German government to these associations, partly explaining their continued growth, and creating serious political problems—especially in regard to the secessionist claims of Kurds. One could say that the deprivation of political rights to migrant workers in a host country created excessive political polarization among the minority groups. (Sweden was an exception: it had granted political rights on the communal level since 1975.) It can be argued that migrants who are compelled to live under such a system of deprivation show two kinds of tendencies: either they fall into a state of complete political disinterest, or their political interest grows so much that they seek "buffer" institutions such as associations for the fulfillment of their aspirations (Abadan-Unat 1979:27).

In addition to the growing impact of associational activities, this phase witnessed another unexpected development. In 1978 the ban on further recruitment in Europe had been reinforced. The authorities in West Germany were then suddenly confronted with an enormous increase of so-called "political refugees" who requested asylum. In reality these people were mostly job-seeking potential migrants who through the efforts of some German lawyers were helped to articulate their demands. Owing to a special constitutional provision, until 18 June 1980 every person seeking asylum was admitted into the country, housed at government expense (sometimes in very good hotels), granted a weekly monetary allowance, and given a work

permit until his case was settled—a procedure which in the past had sometimes taken seven or eight years. Table 7 indicates the sudden growth of these disguised economically motivated migrants.

The German authorities, concerned with the rapid increase in migrants seeking political asylum, enacted measures in June 1980 to cut down the numbers of applications for asylum based on economic rather than political reasons. Among other things, these compelled applicants to take up residence in camps and put an end to the issuing of work permits and social security rights (OECD 1981:19). There was a decline in the number of candidates seeking asylum each month—from 10,932 in May 1980 (of which 6,685, or 61.2 percent, were Turks) to 2,338 in April 1981 (of which 405, or 17.3 percent, were Turks).

Finally, during this phase West Germany—followed by all European countries except Great Britain and Italy—introduced a visa requirement for Turks. It was a cumbersome bureaucratic formality which largely reduced the visits between migrants and the families they had left behind; it contributed to a growing tension between the host countries and their foreign manpower.

Xenophobia has grown, mostly due to the increases in unemployment in European countries. It has led to dramatic incidents

Table 7

TURKS SEEKING ASYLUM IN WEST GERMANY, 1976-83

| Year | Number | Percent of Total Asylum Seekers |
|---|---|---|
| 1976 | 809 | 7.3% |
| 1977 | 1,168 | 7.1 |
| 1978 | 7,419 | 22.4 |
| 1979 | 13,246 | 25.7 |
| 1980 | 57,913 | 53.7 |
| 1981 | 6,302 | 12.8 |
| 1982 | 3,688 | 9.9 |
| 1983[a] | 980 | |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1984b:7, table 2.1.1.10.

[a]Until August.

among Turkish migrants, such as suicides, homicides of young children, and increasing graffiti in Germany's large cities calling for a quick exit of "Jews and Turks." The negative climate of opinion, with openly racist tendencies, has received additional intellectual support by anti-migrant manifestos like the Heidelberg Declaration, signed by sixteen West German university professors who call for the fast evacuation of all migrant workers while stressing their duty to preserve the "Christian/Occidental values of Europe" (*Die Zeit*, 26 February 1982:61). These tendencies become particularly noticeable during pre-election and pre-convention periods, and they are increasingly contributing to intolerance and racial and religious discrimination. The American press recently reported the following:

> The new prime minister of West Germany aims at defining a new "humane immigration policy." This policy is based on integrating foreigners into German society, limiting how many foreigners would be admitted to settle in the country and providing incentives for those wishing to return. In contrast to the system in the U.S. where children born of foreign residents are automatically eligible for citizenship, children born to foreign workers in West Germany are subject to the same visa and registration restrictions as their parents. If they wish to become citizens, they must apply. According to German officials, most foreign workers prefer permanent resident alien status to citizenship. Due to increasing xenophobia about 120,000 Turkish workers returned in 1983 to their homeland ("A New Racism in West Germany"; *San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 August 1984).

## TURKISH MIGRATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST

A major shift in the migration of Turkish manpower from Western Europe to the Middle East and North Africa began in 1979 and continued in 1980 and 1981. Before we attempt to compare European and Middle Eastern host countries, a short structural overview of the region will be helpful.

### DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

One of the most striking characteristics of the Middle East is that the most populous countries are the poorest in natural resources,

while the richest countries have the smallest populations. In addition, there are vast differences in technological development and manpower availability. In terms of manpower the countries can be classified into three major categories:

1. Countries that export largely skilled or professional labor (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey);
2. Countries that import a large portion of their labor force, particularly skilled workers (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen [YAR]);
3. Relatively self-sufficient countries which neither import nor export labor extensively (Tunisia, Morocco, Syria).

As pointed out by a World Bank report (1981:8), Iraq, Algeria from 1976, and in more recent years Jordan, the YAR, and Oman have a dual role in the international labor market in which they both export and import labor.

A second feature of almost all of the Middle Eastern countries is that they have a distinctly different distribution of the labor force from that of Western Europe (see Table 8). In general labor is concentrated in agriculture and services rather than in industry. This is mostly due to internal migration and fast depeasantization, which produces an informal or marginal sector, as well as overemployment in public sectors.

A third important and distinctive feature of labor-importing Middle Eastern countries is that the share of migrant labor in total employment exceeds 50 percent in the case of Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar. For the remaining labor-importing countries, the share is close to half of total employment (see Table 9). The non-national labor force is concentrated in construction and manufacturing. As in Europe labor in the construction sector is predominantly foreign—60 percent in Kuwait, 64 percent in Libya, 48 percent in Saudi Arabia, 82 percent in Qatar, and 96 percent in Abu Dhabi (Labib 1980:3). The distribution of the Turkish labor force in selected countries is shown in Table 10.

By 1975—i.e., within 20 years since substantial labor migration had begun in the Middle East—the number of migrants in the oil-rich countries had reached nearly 3.5 million, 1.82 million of whom were actively employed. The number of migrants for 1985 is estimated at 10 million. However, it is estimated that only 55 percent of the migrant workers will come from Arab or other Middle Eastern countries

Table 8

STRUCTURE OF THE LABOR FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1977
*(Percent)*

| | Economic Sector | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Country | Agriculture | Services | Industry |
| Turkey | 64% | 27% | 9% |
| Saudi Arabia | 63 | 23 | 14 |
| Morocco | 55 | 28 | 17 |
| Syria | 49 | 28 | 23 |
| Iraq | 43 | 32 | 25 |
| Tunisia | 39 | 39 | 22 |
| Algeria | 30 | 53 | 17 |
| Jordan | 28 | 33 | 39 |
| Libya | 23 | 52 | 25 |
| Lebanon | 13 | 60 | 27 |
| Kuwait | 2 | 73 | 25 |

*Source:* Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries (Ankara) 1981a:8, table 4.

Table 9

EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONALS AND NON-NATIONALS IN MAJOR LABOR-IMPORTING MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, 1975

| Importing Country | Number Employed | Nationals *(Percent)* | Non-Nationals *(Percent)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 1,799,900 | 57.0% | 43.0% |
| Libya | 781,600 | 57.5 | 42.5 |
| Kuwait | 299,800 | 30.6 | 69.4 |
| UAE | 296,500 | 15.2 | 84.8 |
| Oman | 207,700 | 66.0 | 34.0 |
| Bahrain | 75,800 | 60.4 | 39.6 |
| Qatar | 66,200 | 18.9 | 81.1 |
| *Total* | 3,527,600 | 51.3 | 48.7 |

*Source:* Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries (Ankara) 1981a:20, table 8.

Table 10

DISTRIBUTION OF TURKISH LABOR FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, AND LIBYA BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1983

| Sector | Saudi Arabia | Iraq | Libya |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | 6,300 | 3,176 | 2,000 |
| Construction | 111,600 | 4,719 | 72,000 |
| Services | 2,100 | 1,249 | 1,500 |
| *Total* | 120,000 | 9,284 | 75,500 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1984a: 91, 98, 104.

such as Turkey, and the rest will come from Asia (predominantly Pakistan and Sri Lanka for unskilled work and Korea for highly skilled jobs).

It is important to note the following additional features about foreign manpower in the Middle East:

1) It is predominantly male; except for teaching, employment for women is extremely limited;
2) With the exception of highly skilled foreigners, workers are obliged to live quite celibate lives;
3) Recruitment is usually through firms operating in the host country; local agents; unofficial middlemen; or within the framework of a larger "package deal" by a multinational corporation, sometimes through advertising;
4) Work and residence permits are strictly confined to times stipulated in work contracts; a change of work place is possible only through written permission (*tenezzül*);
5) Bilateral agreements are not the rule;
6) Unless migrant workers belong to highly skilled professional groups, they cannot formally be granted permission to settle in a host country for an indefinite period unless they are accompanied by their families; however, some host countries have begun to disregard this ban.

## TURKISH MANPOWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As the opportunities for emigration to Western Europe gradually narrowed during the mid-1970s, Turkish workers directed their aspirations to Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries. The scarcity of reliable statistics in this region poses some difficulty in properly assessing the scope of the "second Turkish wave." According to the OECD's SOPEMI reports, in 1980, 28,443 Turkish workers were sent abroad through the placement services. The Arab countries absorbed about 73 percent of the flow, with Libya alone taking 15,090 workers. The great majority of these workers were male, most of them highly skilled, and with contracts of limited and usually short duration. Doctors, engineers, architects, and accountants were the most common of the highly specialized professionals. The Turkish Employment Service supplied only about 15 percent of the workers—mostly those going to non-Arab countries. The rest were recruited by Turkish entrepreneurs themselves. According to the 1983 report of the Ministry of Labor, the total number of Turkish workers in Arab countries is around 215,284; roughly 37 percent are employed in Libya, 59 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 4 percent in Iraq. No exact figures are available for the UAE. Of the Turkish workers in the Middle East 60 percent are unskilled, 35 percent are skilled, and 5 percent belong to the highly skilled technical manpower group (Adler 1981:34).

Table 11 gives the estimated number of Turkish workers in North Africa and the Middle East in recent years. The projections for 1985 may not be realized due to political events such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iran/Iraq war. However, the estimated increase in migration to Libya and Saudi Arabia is likely to prove accurate. A major reason for this increase is a significant growth in the number of Turkish firms established in the Middle East by Turkish entrepreneurs, who in 1981 alone signed contracts for infrastructure projects for over $7 billion. (For a distribution of these firms by country, see Table 12.) In spite of the steady growth of Turkish entrepreneurial initiative, there seems to be a limit to the potential increase in Turkish migration to the Middle East because in recent years there has been an official policy to reduce the numbers of workers from Arab and Middle Eastern Moslem countries in favor of workers from Asian countries. Thus in 1980 the proportion of migrant workers to the Middle East and Africa from Arab countries fell from 71.2 to 54.8 percent, while the proportion of Asian migrant workers rose from

Table 11

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TURKISH WORKERS IN NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST, 1980-85

| Country | 1980 | 1981 | 1985[a] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libya | 38,000 | 60,000 | 150,000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 45,000 | 56,000 | 80,000 |
| Iraq | 8,000 | 16,000 | 80,000 |
| UAE | 3,000 | 4,000 | 10,000 |
| Kuwait | 2,000 | 2,500 | 5,000 |
| Jordan | 1,500 | 2,500 | 7,000 |
| Qatar | 1,000 | 2,500 | 5,000 |
| Bahrain | 500 | 1,000 | 2,000 |
| Lebanon | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Other[b] | 1,000 | 4,500 | 10,000 |
| *Total* | 101,000 | 150,000 | 350,000 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:98, table 21.

[a]Figures are projections.

[b]Iran, Oman, YAR, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Sudan.

Table 12

TURKISH FIRMS ESTABLISHED IN ARAB COUNTRIES, 1979-81

| Country | 1979 | 1980 | 1981[a] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libya | 17 | 30 | 38 |
| Saudi Arabia | 6 | 13 | 15 |
| Iraq | 3 | 7 | 8 |
| Kuwait | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| UAE | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Jordan | — | 1 | 2 |
| *Total* | 28 | 54 | 67 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:94, table 19.

[a]Figures are for January-March only.

25.6 to 33.7 percent. (The share of Turkish migrant workers increased from 0.5 to 3.1 percent [Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:94; see also World Bank 1981:112].)

The influx of Asian workers is mostly due to their willingness to work for relatively low wages. For example, a typical Turkish worker will accept a month-long contract to work six days per week and eight hours a day for no less than $300. Asian workers will sign such a contract for less: Thais for $225, Indians for $210, Filipinos for $208, and Pakistanis for $193 (Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982: 95-96).

## SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

One of the major differences between migrant work in Europe and the Middle East lies in the application of social security to migrant workers. In principle almost all Islamic countries have established some kind of social security system inspired by the European model, but in practice the system has not been carried out. Libya has ratified Convention No. 118 of the Equality of Treatment for All Sectors agreement, an inter-Arab pact (Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries 1981b:39). Furthermore, Libya is the first—and so far the only—country which has signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey. This agreement (signed 5 January 1975) was followed by a specific social security agreement in 1976. These agreements provide Turkish workers all the social security rights and duties stipulated in Libyan legislation—i.e., equal treatment. The agreements specify the proportion of earnings that Turkish workers are allowed to transfer to the home country: 90 percent for unmarried workers and 60 percent for married workers living with their families. However, thus far Libyan authorities have permitted transfers of only 30 percent. Similarly the stipulation on pension rights (whereby a worker's employment in both Turkey and Libya would be considered) has not been implemented. Moreover, schools for Turkish children, to be established according to the agreements, have not been set up. Finally, some employers have been reluctant to issue workers a service certificate enabling them to change their workplace; such certificates represent the major subject of current negotiations (*Günaydın* [Istanbul], 2/9/81; Çölaşan 1980).

## TURKEY'S MAJOR SOCIAL LEGISLATION RELATING TO EXTERNAL MIGRATION

### REMITTANCES

Remittances are the most widely recognized benefit of labor exportation. Not only are they beneficial to the balance of payments, but also they alleviate traditional foreign exchange bottlenecks. Arguments in favor of remittances inspired the architects of the First Five-Year Development Plan to encourage and organize the "export of excess manpower" (including skilled labor) on a governmental level. Stephen Adler (1981) has analyzed the impact of remittances on Turkey's economy, distinguishing among macro, regional, and family/individual levels, as well as between "consumption" and "investment." Much of the discussion below draws on Adler's work.

In an assessment of the contribution of remittances to the economy as a whole, there is a tendency to compare them to foreign aid and direct foreign investment. Although the impact of these flows on the balance of payments is essentially the same, their contributions to capital outlays and economic growth are not identical. Foreign aid and foreign investment are frequently earmarked for specific investment by government or private sectors. Remittances, on the other hand, are transfers of personal income which are used partly for consumption by the immediate family of the migrant worker at home or by the worker himself upon his return; therefore they are only partly for savings and investment. Furthermore, remittances very often have some negative effects, as has been observed in Egypt. The preface to the Egyptian national plan for 1978-82 states that "a growing number of Egyptians work abroad for very high wages. These individuals return home with huge purchasing powers, which they direct toward flagrant and luxurious consumption" (Egypt, Ministry of Planning 1978:214). The tendency toward conspicuous consumption has been closely observed in Turkey. It is partly related to a desire to acquire prestige and achieve upward mobility. Two examples might help to illustrate the point. One case is of a returned migrant who had very little land:

> Even before he went abroad Mehmed had an investment plan for what he would save: "I thought of building a new house; we had no house then. I dreamed that my daughter would become a tailor and that I would buy a tractor, if Allah permits me. I thought, I will bring my daughter-in-law to my new house with my own tractor. And,

> Allah be thanked, in 1973 I brought my daughter-in-law to my new house with my own tractor!" (van Velzen and Penninx 1976:218).

Tractors acquired for such purposes usually stayed idle or were from time to time offered for rent elsewhere.

In the other case family members who are left behind have used the remittances in useless conspicuous consumption:

> Şahap has been employed for 11 years in the Netherlands. He lives in the largest house in his village. The guestroom, furnished with modern city furniture, was overflowing with machines and gadgets. Nothing looked used. There were 2 electric blankets, 2 lamps, an electric juice squeezer, an electric knife sharpener, 5 or 6 clocks, a vacuum cleaner, plastic party decorations hanging from the ceiling, a breakfront full of cups and plates and a teflon pan, even a sun-lamp for someone's rheumatic pains. There was also a washing machine with dryer of Turkish manufacture. Şahap's wife said she used it, but that, too, did not look used. They also had a brand new refrigerator which was stored in the bedroom for the time being (Yenisey 1976:363-64).

One may say that on the macro level remittances in Turkey have had a beneficial impact, particularly in regard to bridging the gap in the balance of trade and in filling the need for foreign exchange. On the regional and macro levels, the increased wealth and spending power of migrants have had a "spinoff" effect on the local economy especially in regard to the housing industry. A number of authors—particularly Penninx and van Velzen (1976)—have pointed to the disappointing effects on the regional level.

The role of remittances in the Turkish economy can be easily inferred from Table 13. It should be noted that Turkey's remittances were $45 million in 1964 and had reached more than $2 billion by 1980. The increase in remittances in 1980/81 is closely related to the relative stability after the military takeover in September 1980. Another important factor has been the special interest rate given by Turkish banks to savings accounts established in foreign currencies.

It should be emphasized that remittances do not always come through official channels, but also informally through visiting migrants or the black market. The country's dependence on external sources of energy (such as the import of gasoline), as well as the increased import of consumer goods, have strengthened the prevailing asymmetric relationship between sending and host countries.

Table 13

WORKERS' REMITTANCES TO TURKEY, SEPTEMBER 1979-SEPTEMBER 1983
*(U.S. $ billion)*

| Year | Remittances |
|---|---|
| 1979/80 | $1.693 |
| 1980/81 | $2.476 |
| 1981/82 | $2.186 |
| 1982/83 | $1.553 |

*Source:* Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1984a:155, table 6.

In consequence, Turkey has passed social legislation in an attempt to make better use of the remittances. For example, laws geared to support the domestic car industry guarantee immediate delivery of domestic automobiles if they are paid for in foreign currency. The most recent legislation shortens the duration of compulsory military service in exchange for foreign currency. According to Law No. 2299, which entered into force on 1 December 1980 and was amended in June 1984, Turkish citizens up to the age of 32 who pay the equivalent of TL 600,000 need to serve in the military for only 2 months.* This law is justified on the grounds that compulsory military service should not cause Turkish workers abroad to lose their jobs and deprive the country of future remittances (Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:198).

## SPECIAL CREDIT ALLOCATIONS

From the very beginning of its citizens' exodus to foreign labor markets, Turkey has attempted to channel their savings into productive areas of the national economy. These efforts have not been particularly successful as migrants have been mostly interested in using their savings to acquire houses, condominiums, land, or small

*The exemption fee is calculated according to the value of foreign currency as of 1 March 1981. At that time, $1 was equal to TL 170. Thus the fee amounts to $5,174.

businesses such as restaurants, coffee shops, taxi services, barbershops, and repair shops. The investment patterns of migrants have changed in recent years for two major reasons: (a) As migrants abroad have increasingly opted for a semi-permanent stay in the host country, they have begun to invest there; (b) In Turkey brokers, banks, and investment corporations have competed intensely to offer special high interest rates for foreign currency and have attracted a substantial amount of workers' savings. This source of remittances might significantly decline following the bankruptcy of both small and large brokers in the late 1970s and early 1980s; Turkey's largest broker, Kastelli, fled the country in June 1981.

*Domestic Credit Allocations.* Efforts to channel migrants' savings into productive economic areas go back as far as 1964. Special legislative measures were designed to encourage Turkish workers abroad to remit their savings home. For example, one law (no. 499) allocated special credits to migrants who opened accounts in foreign currencies in any of several state banks. The Emlâk Kredi Bankası (Real Estate Bank), the most important mortgage bank in Turkey, offered mortgages on the condition that an applicant kept at least 40 percent of the desired loan in a savings account for three years. This scheme did not become popular at all. Another state bank, the Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank), offered migrants loans to purchase land or farm machinery. These loans were also not much used. The most popular credit offered by national banks has been that of the Halk Bankası (People's Bank). Founded in 1938 as a credit source for artisans and small-scale industrialists, after 1960 this bank started to provide managerial and technical assistance to small enterprises. After 1975 it offered a special credit plan for migrant workers: whoever opened an account with foreign currency of at least DM 20,000 could obtain a loan after one year of TL 1,250,000. Yet even this scheme in its first year attracted only 173 Turkish workers abroad ("Development of Small Scale Industry, Emergence of a New Economic Class and Role of Türkiye Halk Bankası"; *Turkish Daily News*, 2/1/75).

Turkey's provisions for the State Industry and Workers' Investment Bank (DESIYAB) deserve special attention. Law No. 1877 (17 April 1975) empowered the government to establish a bank within two years which would (a) consolidate the savings of citizens abroad and use these savings productively; and (b) channel these savings into countrywide enterprises, especially industrial investments in accordance with the aims of national development. Thus far, however, the

bank is still in the building phase and has not had a decisive role in regard to workers' savings (Turkey, Senate 1980:24).

The balance sheet of the past twenty years indicates that attracting remittances for productive home investment by central authorities has proved awkward and elusive (in other labor-exporting countries as well as Turkey). A similar conclusion can be drawn in regard to investment programs for returning migrants. These can best be seen in terms of credit arrangements with host countries.

*Bilateral Credit Arrangements.* The bilateral agreement between Turkey and West Germany signed in 1972 was conceived in order to create a special credit fund for migrants. In July 1972 the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation made over DM 2.5 million available for initial deposit in the fund. The beneficiaries were to be migrants definitely returning to Turkey who wished to establish small businesses. A prerequisite for applying for credit from the fund was a training program in West Germany and a follow-up program in business administration in Turkey. This project, which was supposed to become an essential part of a reintegration policy for returnees, has not been successful. The number of returnees has thus far remained below all estimates, even in periods of recession (Abadan-Unat 1971: 26)—mainly because of an extraordinarily high rate of unemployment in Turkey. According to the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, in 1978, 2,286,000 were unemployed out of an economically active population of 16,411,000. In addition, inflation has continued to grow. After the Christian Democratic party took power in West Germany in 1982, the government offered foreigners without "valid" jobs about $3,600 per adult and $500 per child to leave the country; the offer expired 30 June 1984 ("A New Racism in West Germany"; *San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 August 1984).

## VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVES

In spite of a poor record on government-sponsored investment schemes, Turkey attempted to develop "participatory" investment projects. First launched in 1962 by the Ministry of Village Affairs, the objective of the Village Development Cooperatives (VDCs) was to generate employment and use potential savings productively. At the same time, these institutions tried to establish priority ranking for their members for job vacancies abroad; this aim was vitally important,

as the number of migrant candidates was constantly swelling and reached 1.5 million by the late 1970s (Geray 1981:80-87).

The preliminary requirement to enter the VDCs during 1963-65 was a membership pledge of TL 8,000, only TL 2,000 of which was requested as a down payment. During the initial period the coops were used almost uniquely to bypass the disproportionally long waiting lists for migration. In 1965 the Ministry of Village Affairs undertook a critical reappraisal of the VDCs and developed a blueprint for their use (van Renselaar and van Velzen 1976:105-6). The blueprint comprised the following essential points:

(a) As of March 1966 for three succeeding years at least 20,000 individuals from the 150 village cooperatives already in existence would be allocated jobs abroad. Every migrating member would contribute between TL 5,000 and 15,000 to the cooperative;

(b) The government would increase the contributions of the individual migrants by making up to TL 900 million available in credit;

(c) In addition to awarding quotas to VDCs for priority placement of members abroad, the Employment Service would see that members met their obligations;

(d) A special department for cooperatives would be set up in the Ministry of Village Affairs.

By 1966 there were 382 VDCs, and in 1967, 1,349. The Ministry of Village Affairs had not foreseen the "success"(!) of this program (van Renselaar and van Velzen 1976:107). In reality the VDC project was implemented solely to assure coop members priority in finding work in Europe. Detailed information about the cooperatives was distributed by some MPs who were anxious to secure employment opportunities for their constituents in return for electoral support (Abadan-Unat and Ünsal 1976:88-89).

A change in government in Turkey in 1965, its reluctance to back the cooperative movement, as well as an economic recession in 1966-67 in West Germany, slowed down the movement. Between 1967 and 1968 there was hardly any increase; the total number rose to 1,381. After 1973, with the labor ban in Western Europe, initiatives to found new cooperatives came totally to an end.

Evaluating the VDC program, we find that the majority of its projects were not successfully or effectively realized for the following reasons: (a) Political and administrative inertia and excessive red

tape; (b) Inability of the Ministry of Village Affairs to control the projects; (c) Lack of expertise and leadership among the members. A few examples will illustrate the point. The cooperative of Yenifakılı in Yozgat, one of the initial "pilot projects," built a flour mill in 1973. Shortly after, control of the mill passed into the hands of local grain merchants. In 1975 the mill was closed (van Velzen and Penninx (1976:240). The Çandır cooperative in Yozgat undertook to build a factory to produce sunflower oil; it was backed by the State Planning Organization. However, it selected an inappropriate site and in addition it was unable to collect the necessary supply of seed; thus it could produce only 0.24 percent of Turkey's total sunflower oil (Geray 1981:80-87).

Thus far comprehensive studies on village development, such as that by Sevin Osmay (1975) have all shown that the disguised purpose of the VDC program (i.e., filling job vacancies abroad) explains their failure. The cooperatives could certainly have been of great benefit for rural areas with heavy out-migration if properly prepared, implemented, and controlled.

## WORKERS' COMPANIES

A second major instrument for channeling the savings of Turkish workers toward employment-generating investments is the Turkish Workers' Companies (TWCs). (Penninx and van Renselaar [1976] call them "workers' joint stock corporations," and Suzanne Paine [1974:114-15] calls them "work ventures.") The essential features of this type of investment scheme are the following:

1) TWCs are economic self-help initiatives of Turkish migrants, who invest their savings in the form of shares to establish a firm;
2) The number of founding members is usually small; they are strongly dependent on other participants and local leaders;
3) In their charters TWCs exclude takeovers by large-scale investors;
4) TWCs are primarily regionally oriented;
5) Shares are usually transferable only after a certain time period;
6) The average capital investment amounts to about TL 50-75 million and creates about 100 jobs, which are supposed to be instrumental for the reintegration of returnees;

7) TWCs are supported by governmental policies such as exemptions from duties for imported machinery, exemptions from taxes, and the establishment of the State Industry and Workers' Investment Bank;
8) TWCs have been linked through bilateral agreements with other countries—e.g., the Ankara Agreement between Turkey and West Germany (Werth and Yalçintaş 1978).

The exact number of TWCs in existence is not certain. An interim report concerning the development of economic initiatives in Turkey, prepared jointly by the universities of Istanbul/Turkey and Saarbrücken/West Germany (cited as ISOPLAN), reported 125 such companies in 1977, of which 78 were in operation. Adler (1981), referring to a 1978 report undertaken by the International Labor Organization (ILO), reports 141 cases, of which 42 were operational. Penninx and van Renselaar (1978) took a sample of 64 companies, of which 24 were in production. Şen (1980:233) analyzed 32 TWCs in 15 locations, 11 of which had not yet passed into production. The most recent report of the Turkish Ministry of Labor (1982:313-28) reports about 100 TWCs in the production stage, with a total personnel of 10,972; 63 TWCs are in the investment stage and have an estimated 8,143 job openings.

There have been two major responses to the TWC experiment. On one hand, a number of authors (Gitmez, Penninx, van Renselaar, Paine, Adler, Abadan-Unat) consider that it has had only a marginal impact on Turkish employment. They point to (a) a high proportion of failures, (b) the small scale of the TWCs, (c) their vulnerability in competition, and (d) their irrelevance to Turkey's development priorities. On the other hand, some authors (Yasa, Bozkurt, Güven, Yalçintaş) have responded optimistically, placing more importance on regional diversification, the creation of employment, and small- or medium-scale industries. They defend the thesis that TWCs represent a genuine entrepreneurial initiative whose potential power is far from being realized and for which new policies are required. A slightly different point of view is offered by Şen, who emphasizes the important function of social change which emanates from these ventures, although he (among others) is seriously worried about new conflict situations which are bound to emerge between the private sector properly speaking and the "people's sector" represented by these investments.

In brief, the majority of TWCs are in a precarious position. Many projects became irrelevant due to serious delays in feasibility

studies, allocation of credits, inflation, and devaluation. TWCs suffer from inadequate management at the top, high debt ratios, and shortages of working capital. Furthermore, one of the major causes of failure has been the strong motivation to choose sites less on the basis of rentability, adequate communication networks, and transport facilities and more for what could be defined as "local patriotism."

When TWCs are considered as a means of reintegrating returning workers into their society, it should be kept in mind that psychological motives play a major role. Returning workers are strongly determined to set up businesses of their own for which they alone are responsible ("bazaar capitalism"). However, this inclination does not prevent them from contributing to projects from which their home town or region could benefit. Their virulent local patriotism causes them to identify with the problems of their home regions. In press interviews of TWC shareholders the following kind of argument is often expressed: "Why did I invest in local industry? Our sultans spent billions, built mosques and palaces in Istanbul, but no factories; that's why we are underdeveloped. Only industrialization can save us!" Unfortunately most of those who hold these ideas are unable to exercise the rational thinking necessary for the functioning of highly developed technologies.

The assumption that the good will of investors and modest starting capital are sufficient to overcome the hurdles of economic underdevelopment is doubtlessly extremely naive. Innovative entrepreneurs are the products of a certain level of economic growth and technological progress. Thus the most rational way to attract the savings of Turkish workers (estimated at DM 6 billion in German banks) would lie in an ability to conceive, design, and realize a bold, motivating, promising public policy. In spite of all their shortcomings, the TWCs appear to be the most imaginative device to channel savings into productive investment. The number of TWCs and the capital transferred and accumulated deserve sincere admiration. According to the most recent statistics (Turkey, Ministry of Labor 1982:33), 104,773 shareholders living and working abroad have invested TL 18 billion (approximately $1.8 million) to create 20,753 jobs.

## MIGRATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The exodus of almost two million Turks over the past twenty years to nearly thirty countries of the globe has no doubt created a

deep, lasting effect on Turkey. Contrary to the findings of D. Lerner in the early 1950s (when he attempted to describe the transition from traditional society toward modernization and gauge the impact of urbanization, education, and exposure to mass media), the empathy among Turks, which was then quite low, has increased remarkably since that time. The willingness—or better said the eagerness—of Turkey's rural population to envisage life in any part of the world indicates that migration has become an accepted lifestyle alternative for the majority of Turks. Nevertheless, this new outlook to life and career has created important changes in both the host and home countries.

## IMPACT OF MIGRANTS ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE HOST AND HOME COUNTRIES

The most visible and measurable impact of foreign workers in highly industrialized countries is their predominant share in labor market "dirty work"—jobs that are dangerous, temporary, dead end, undignified, and menial. The presence of the migrant workers to do these jobs frees the domestic workforce to take higher paying and "cleaner" jobs that tend not to be dangerous, dirty, or temporary. In short, as Castles and Kosack (1973) point out, the migrant workers provide an underclass which of itself generates social and economic mobility for the domestic labor force.

The clearest theoretical interpretation of this process is provided by Hoffmann-Nowotny (1981), who refers to the creation of a new societal stratum beneath the existing social structure of the host country as an example of *Unterschichtung* (undercasting). The concept is one of the major elements of Hoffmann-Nowotny's theory of societal systems. He asserts that migration is a process of societal interaction whose effect is to reduce tension. Emigration from a home country exports tension. Through immigration tension can be localized in the lower economic strata. As a result of undercasting, the host system provides greater opportunities for its members to climb into higher positions of the employment structure. Upward mobility takes place intra- as well as intergenerationally. However, immigrants, as a result of a negative status ascription ("foreigners"), have little opportunity for mobility and remain for the most part at the bottom (pp. 74-77). The migrant worker is in an ambivalent position. In the host country his educational background, culture, and

religion force him into the lower social echelons: the majority of Turkish workers are unskilled, have relatively little education, and have contributed to the growth of unemployment; moreover, increasing xenophobia is nurtured by the fact that they are Moslem. Indeed the Turkish worker is a kind of "industrial pariah." At the same time, in his community at home he gains unanimous approval as someone who has moved up the social echelon.

## SOCIAL MOBILITY

Among the Turkish migrant population in host countries there is a noticeable amount of intergenerational mobility, specifically from agricultural occupations to industrial or tertiary occupations (Abadan-Unat 1974:392-93). However, the relatively high percentage of semi-qualified Turkish workers in Europe has not achieved upward mobility; on the contrary, noticeable downward mobility has taken place because a large number of primary school teachers, accountants, and the like have opted (for higher wages and a different lifestyle) to leave their white-collar jobs and become industrial workers. Downward mobility has also produced what Lenski (1966) calls "status inconsistency." Lenski suggests that status inconsistency offers an explanation for the dissatisfaction of migrants with both host and home country and their constant search for a "better future" (p. 88). In some cases it may lead to support for radical political movements.

## LOSS OF SKILLED LABOR

As a labor-exporting country, Turkey has lost considerable skilled labor, and the loss has been accentuated by a parallel loss owing to a "brain drain." Indeed Turkey continues to export a higher percentage of its skilled labor force than any other labor-exporting Mediterranean country. Turkey has restricted emigration only by miners from the Zonguldak district. Other Mediterranean countries have been much more reluctant to give up their skilled labor force while Turkey has not hesitated to export an important part of its qualified manpower (see Table 14). Between 1964 and 1971 nearly 17 percent of Turkey's skilled workers emigrated. (High-level manpower is excluded.) Such an outflow no doubt had a negative impact on output: the Second Five-Year Plan estimated shortages of skilled

Table 14

SKILLED TURKISH WORKERS SENT BY EMPLOYMENT SERVICE TO EUROPE, 1964-71

| Year | Number of Workers Abroad | Skilled Labor *(Percent)* |
|---|---|---|
| 1964-66 | 152,106 | 35.4% |
| 1967 | 8,947 | 31.2 |
| 1968 | 43,205 | 28.1 |
| 1969 | 103,075 | 31.2 |
| 1970 | 129,575 | 27.0 |
| 1971 | 88,442 | 37.7 |

*Source:* Turkey: Employment Services 1964-71, and State Planning Organization 1973:676.

workers in 1970 and 1975 at 337,000 and 885,000 respectively (Aydınoğlu 1976: 109-10).

The policy of allowing skilled labor to emigrate has been sharply criticized by the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, the Ministry of Industry and the State Planning Organization (among others), but it has continued in order to maintain a continuous flow of remittances. It may be argued that the high skill levels of Turkish migrants have helped host countries to realize their own development programs.

## IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

Predominantly agrarian regions with a high rate of external migration are witnessing a number of changes, such as the erosion of the adult male population and the creation of a population of women, small children, and the elderly. Furthermore, regions with high out-migration are not willing to engage in traditional agrarian activities, thus becoming centers of secondary migrant outflow. Intense migration may also cause a phasing-out of animal-based tilling, as the following case study shows:

> Around 1965 in Müftükişla [village] there were more than 80 teams of horses in the village. Nearly everyone tilled his own fields

with his own animals. There was one tractor. With the advent of migration, workers leaving the village entered into an agreement of sharing the crop with the owner of the tractor. In 1975 no horses were left in the village. Farmwork is performed by the seven tractors now owned there (van Velzen and Penninx 1976:231-32).*

This case study also shows the indirect impact of legislation which accorded special import rights to migrant workers. Lawmakers thought that encouraging investment in farming machinery would lead to higher productivity. Instead it has led to overmechanization and attempts to build personal prestige.

## INCREASE OF FEMALE/MALE MIGRATION AND ITS EFFECT ON SEX ROLES

External migration has encouraged women as well as men to seek employment abroad. In West Germany alone the number of gainfully employed Turkish women—which was 173 in 1960—reached 143,611 in 1975 (Abadan-Unat 1977:33). In 1981 there were 597,827 men 16 years and older, 393,216 women 16 years and older, and 555,268 children under 16 years. Out of the total female population in West Germany in that period, 177,143 were gainfully employed (OECD 1982:41, 66). In Austria in 1978 there were 12,450 Turkish women with work permits, representing 25.5 percent of the gainfully employed Turkish worker population. Not only were more Turkish women taking up employment in industry or services, but also more wives were joining their husbands in Europe. This exodus of women induced a great number of changes. The most important one seems to concern the economic independence of women. Due to the entrance of women into the labor market, nuclear families increased as dependency relationships to members of the extended family became redundant. Moreover, the responsibilities within families concerning breadwinning, bank accounts, saving, investing, and spending changed. The emancipation of women became more noticeable. It also caused a substantial amount of marital strain and conflict. The ones who suffered most in this framework were the elder daughters in a family; as noted, they had to shoulder heavy responsibilities as mother

*In a similar vein Magnarella has observed the following: "Foreign earnings have brought a high degree of economic equality to Hayriye village as former peasants with insufficient land must no longer work for others" (1979:161).

substitutes. Under the circumstances, the entry into industry and services of conventionally trained women (especially from rural backgrounds) may lead to isolation for the daughters and the reinforcement of traditional values and attitudes. Thus external migration may be an isolating as well as a liberating process.

The mixture of positive and negative consequences faced by migrating women can also be observed among the family members left behind. For women who stay with their in-laws, interfamily control increases. However, approximately half of the wives and/or mothers decide to set up independent households, and for them there is a noticeable increase in decision-making and authority (Abadan-Unat 1981:27-28, and 1982: 207-34).*

## TREND TOWARD CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION

The most visible effect in Turkey of external migration is the high value placed on conspicuous consumption. Migrants and their families are extremely anxious to acquire an image of affluence and prestige in their communities. This involves (for example) purchasing new styles of furniture, which results in simulated city rooms in villages—even displaying electrical appliances where there is no electricity. This strong tendency toward conspicuous consumption is very eloquently described by Bekir Yıldız, one of Turkey's best known writers:

> Give up eating, Ahmets, give up eating Jales. Load your stuff on trains, Osman and Ayshes. . . . Fly to Turkey, your marks weigh little, but their value goes a long way. Fly home with your marks. Buy plots in our big cities. Even the cemeteries have been uprooted in recent years. These days, second-rate and third-rate cemeteries for those who have died of hunger are going for a song. . . . For those who don't care for farming, there are some other fields of investment. Buy stocks and shares, buy into new industries. When you return to your country, you could become industrialists, no less. What's wrong? Haven't you worked long enough? In this mortal life, it should now be your turn to hire others, to put others to work! (Yıldız 1974:103).

*Kiray emphasizes—correctly—that the "separate-house-in-village syndrome has to be considered as one of the most important functional changes in the role of women, brought by migration in Turkey, as no law of the republican era could bring in such a scale" (1976:223-24).

## A NEW ELEMENT IN TURKISH SOCIETY: THE "*ALAMANYALI*"

Turkish migration has no doubt led to the emergence of a new social stratum. Those living in Europe, regardless of their place of employment, are called *Alamanyalı*—those from Germany. Those who migrated to Middle Eastern countries are labeled "migrating citizens." Both types are rooted in two countries—the host country which provides them employment and a place to live, and the country of their birth and heart. Predominantly employed in industry in Europe, they tend to behave as a privileged group at home. Their preference to live off of rental income or small business produces a type one might call the "proletarian bourgeois" (Abadan-Unat 1972: 293).

These permanently mobile people rank themselves higher at home than in the past. One mother who had three sons employed in Holland stated the following: "Previously the grocer of our village did not even let me enter his shop. Now, if I wish, I could buy out all his staple merchandise!" (Abadan-Unat 1977:46). They feel relatively secure due to their jobs, savings, purchasing power, life experience, and anticipated pensions. Yet most of them face a dilemma in terms of their cultural identity. Their self-imposed isolation from the culture and mores of the host country results from a dislike of integration, changing nationalities, and learning the language of the host country. Nonetheless, the Alamanyalı represent a new generation of those who dare to look for a future outside the national boundaries. As such, they have made a permanent impact on Turkey's economic life and political choice.

In sum, migration has been one of the most powerful vehicles of social change in Turkey (as in other countries). However, unrealistic assessments of it have caused political and economic leaders to believe in unproven assumptions such as "Migration has served to train skilled industrial manpower." Such a contention seems to be much more a case of wishful thinking and a convenient social and political myth than a quantitatively measurable assertion.

A lack of foresight and adequate planning have so far led to a waste of human and financial resources. Yet international migration has in the last quarter of the twentieth century become an essential part of almost all economic systems. In order to reverse the shortcomings of the past, one of the most effective solutions would seem to be well-designed and rationally conceived social legislation in both

the host and home countries, particularly stressing educational policies for the second generation.

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