

**MIGRATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO RE-INTEGRATION
IN INDUSTRY : THE TURKISH CASE**

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MIGRATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO RE-INTEGRATION IN INDUSTRY: THE TURKISH CASE*

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Concepts of Development

Development is defined by some authors as synonymous with economic growth or more specifically with per capital income growth. Others prefer to think of development as a socio-economic process in a particular direction such as the process of nation building, class formation, or the transformation from the agricultural sector. Development can be also treated as a historical category, by which a better understanding of the process of economic and social change in our epoch can be gained. Tackled from this angle international migration as well as internal migration also enter the scope of development.

Concentrating on the connection between the international migration of labour and developmental processes, four interconnected structural processes can be discerned:

- The process of transformation from agrarian activities to industrial activities and the process of urbanization and modernization,
- The process of increasing international integration and thereby greater interdependence between central and peripheral regions,

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- Technological process, modernization and the expansion of multinational concerns,
- The process of uneven regional development.¹

Looked upon this way, development is first of all the sum of differences between today's developed and not developed countries. The basic difference between capitalist industrialized countries and countries which are not industrialized and which have a half-precapitalist economy is structural. It cannot be overcome by economic growth, seen as a merely quantitative change. A not developed country may grow economically and become even less developed than it was before. This may happen, for instance, if the growth is occasioned by the expansion of exports of colonial wares while the consequent increase of imports helps to eliminate domestic manufactures. A similar situation may occur by a high degree of brain drain and loss of skilled labour through large scale migration which decreases the productivity and competitiveness of the domestic market.

The international division of labour

Developed and not developed countries are both results of the Industrial Revolution. The international division of labour established on the basis of this massive change in production is the real origin of the present division of countries throughout the world. Development therefore means to a large extent the process by which colonial economies break away from the ancient international division of labour. By 1930 the «ancient» international division of labour could not be expanded much more. After the Second World War a new situation arose: the systematic intervention by the State in the economy in form of Keynesian policy instruments for expanding effective demand and controlling unemployment, the pursuit of growth and full employment as **political objectives** changed some conditions governing the operation of pre-war capitalist systems. In some respects, capitalism was no longer allowed to proceed according to its own forces of motion.²

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- (1) Leo van VELZEN, **International Labour Migration and Development**, Processes in Yugoslavia and Turkey, A Trendreport, IMWOO-NUFIC, August 1974, p. 3-4.
 - (2) Adriana MARSHALL, **The Import of Labour**, Rotterdam University Press, 1973, p. 10.

Parallel to this new approach the marked rise in the export of manufactured goods from not developed countries after 1960 indicates the emergence of a new group of semi-industrialized countries in the international division of labour.³ These countries mainly due to their centrally planned economies for development as well as public policies such as the export of excess manpower led to a new international division of labour. This division is closely related to industrial production. Indeed with the spreading of mass consumption, a new type of economically motivated mass migration evolved, where basically the attraction of higher wages increased the geographical mobility of people and made this mobility necessary by concentrating at given sites a high number of new industrial activities.

This new process also transformed the predominantly domestic «cityward» migration into an «international» one. In addition, not only industrializing countries participated in these large scale population movements, but a significant number of predominantly «agricultural» or newly industrializing countries also began to participate in this process. This relatively short lasting «immigration boom» in Western Europe, affecting largely the southern shores of the Mediterranean, came to an abrupt stop at the in 1973 time of the oil crisis. Since then the discussion about migration has centered around two distinct opposite, clashing point of view.

Difference in approaches dealing with large scale international migration

In the first decade of the postwar period, which coincides with the adoption of mass-scale, planned, government assisted migration based on bilateral agreements, empirical research efforts concentrated on the exploration of the characteristics of various ethnic groups, their ability and willingness to adjust themselves to the industrial environment, collective housing, problems of acculturation. However as dependence on temporarily recruited

(3) Paul SINGER, International Migration and Development, in UN, 1974 World Population Year, **International Migration Seminar**, Buenos Aires, 5-11 March 1974, CICRED 1974, P. 128.

labour from countries in the European periphery increased, so did opposition to its use. Anti-immigration organizations began to force governments to consider policy changes, such as reducing the demand for immigrant labour settling those already there and restricting new inflows, in order to alleviate some of the social problems which had arisen because of the way that the policy of labour import had been managed. Thus Switzerland attempted to «stabilize» its migrant labour force in spring 1971 and then introduced measures to reduce it in July 1973; in 1972 and 1973 France, Holland and West Germany introduced restrictions on new entrants, culminating at the end of 1973 in a ban by the latter two countries on the entry of non- E.E.C. workers.⁴ Although the two countries attempted to justify their decision concerning a fundamental change in their migration policy, it can safely be assumed that the real reason lies rather in the determination not to overburden the existing social and economic infra-structure of the receiving country. In other words, as long as the migration of workers from the underdeveloped to the industrialized countries fulfill the requisites of the concept of the «latent labour reserve army»⁵, which means as long as unemployment is very small and the rate of capital accumulation is even more rapid than the rate of growth of the labour force and labour productivity, migrant workers serve the function of leverage of wages. In West Germany alone the total number of migrant workers was reduced after the energy crisis from 2.6 to 2.1 million.

Thus, as soon as a significant rate of unemployment among the national labour class becomes noticeable, the necessity to alter the policy of importing manpower becomes an imperative necessity for the receiving countries. The reason why the European Economic Community is not willing to fulfill its pledge and enlarge the realm of free circulation of manpower, for instance, in regard to Turkey, as well as to lift the ban against additional external migration, can best be understood in the light of current figures: At the end of 1975 the total number of migrant workers in was W.

(4) Suzanne PAINE, **Exporting Workers, The Turkish case**, Cambridge University Press, 1974, P. 1.

(5) Georges TAPINOS, **L'Economie des Migrations Internationales**, A. Colin, Paris 1974, P. 241.

Germany 2.1 million. which represented 10.6 % of the active population. The Turks with a total of 550.800 (26 %) still represent the largest contingent of foreigners followed by the Yugoslavs, 429.800 (20.3 %).⁶ At the same time Federal Germany was confronted with a total of 1.183.800 unemployed (5.1 % of the active population), thus ranking second after Italy in Europe. Looking at the problem in general terms it becomes obvious that during the last 14 months alone (December 10, 1973 - February 10, 1975) another 1.450.000 was added to the total figure of unemployed of 4.2 Mill.⁷ It has to be stressed that official circles consider it normal that this type of economic recession should hit first migrant workers, followed by citizens 25 years old and younger and the female labour force.⁸

Planned re-integration : alternative to free flow of labour

These developments induced national and international policy makers, legislators as well as economists and planners to focus their interests on alternatives to mass migration. The major alternatives to migration appear to be as follows: a) Productive and employment generating re-integration of migrant workers in the home country economy, b) Export of capital to labour sending countries.

The validity of these alternatives gains weight when considering that the O.E.C.D. Committee on Manpower recommended as far back as 1969, to undertake «a systematic and coherent analysis of the phenomenon of return, which should not only expore the linkage between the different parts of the migratory chain, but should also indicate the relationship between conjunctural and definitive return, the utilisation of savings and acquired skills.»⁹ In addition on the assumption that temporary migrant manpower -

(6) **Sozial-Report**, Inter-Nationes, Bonn 1975, SR 8-1975, P. 13.

(7) **Avrupa Topluluğu** (Turkish Publication of the Bureau of EEC-Ankara), No. 3, P. 21.

(8) G. TAPINOS, Les Migrations Internationales et la Conjoncture Présente, in F. ANGELI, Ed., **Emigration from Mediterranean Basin to Industrialized Europe** Istituto di Demografia, Roma, 1976, P. 378.

(9) Nermin ABADAN, Le non-retour à l'industrie, trait dominant de la chaîne migratoire turque, **Sociologie du Travail**, No. 3, 1972, p. 279.

once returned definitely - will contribute to the realisation of the respective national development plans persists to be a widespread myth. It is assumed predominantly among political leaders, policy makers, planners and some scholars that the industrial experience acquired by the migrant workers during their stay abroad can be easily transplanted and converted into the machinery of the national industry, that the time spent outside of the country has been a positive and highly instructive one and that those who will return for good will constitute the «avant garde» of the national labour class. This myth must be dismantled and thoroughly analyzed at every occasion. As an ILO report has pointed out, to expect that temporary migration in Europe might help the sending countries to gain much needed skills and know-how through the return of their workers from industrializer countries is a complete self-fornlorn hope.¹⁰ Moreover, it is principally the better educated and better qualified who tend to stay on. Those who return to be the least able to make the grade in the receiving countries and are hardly likely to be the type most needed in their countries of origin. As M. Trebous and F. Cerase have repeatedly pointed out, the sending countries need highly skilled, versatile manual workers, foremen and intermediate personnel, not people who have «learned» to empty dustbins in Munich, turn a screw at Renault's, or wash dishes in Zurich.¹¹ In order to better exemplify this assertion and to evaluate various activities undertaken by returnees, we shall briefly review Turkey's migratory movement in terms of the qualifications of migrant workers and their aspirations after return.

Major characteristics and motivations of Turkish migrant workers

Almost all empirical studies carried out in Turkey on workers prior to their departure confirm the basic trend that Turkey has over the years provided the external labour markets with a relative high proportion of skilled manpower. This can be easily detected in the following Table :

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- (10) ILO, **Some Growing Employment Problems in Europe**, Second European Regional Conference Geneva, January 1974, P. 97.
 - (11) Madeleine TREBOUS, **Migration and Development**, the Case of Algeria, OECD, 1970.

TABLE I
Workers with professional qualifications
(in percentage)

Years	Qualified workers	Non-qualified workers
1965	34,8	65,2
1966	31,2	68,8
1967	32,8	67,2
1968	26,4	73,6
1969	28,2 (27.719)	71,8
1970	34,0 (32.545)	66,0
1971	46,3 (29.556)	53,7

Source : 1965 - 1968 : *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer* 1969, BfA, P. 32;
1969 - 1971 *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer* 1972, BfA, P. 40.

Given the fact that Turkish authorities have attempted to curb the exodus of skilled labour over the years, the likeliness that an additional percentage of migrant workers concealed their existing skill level, is very likely.

Furthermore - again contradicting expectations that migration may serve as a remedy against unemployment - the great majority of migrants have been selected from among the active population of Turkey. Ahmet Aker in his study of 590 workers leaving İstanbul for jobs abroad, indicated that during the one year -1970-71, when this study was carried out, 53.3 % of the sample were industrial workers, another 12.9 % were small selfemployed artisans and craftsmen. The majority of these workers were employed in the same sectors in their new working milieu. According to Aker's study, every third Turkish migrant worker came from one of these three sectors: construction, mining or metal industry.¹² The fact that among the urban migrant workers of Aker's study, 95 % were employed up to four weeks before their departure, indicates clearly that the recruitment policy of industrialized countries prior to the energy crisis was not taking into consideration the explicit guidelines of the planning authorities, who strongly emphasized within the three Five-Year Development Plans, that migration should be basically used for the placement of unskilled and unemployed manpower. The policy followed in

(12) Ahmet AKER, *İşçi Göçü*, Sander Yayını, İstanbul 1972, p. 61.

Turkey primarily by the Federal German Recruitment Office created from time to time in Turkey as in Greece serious bottlenecks affecting the industrialization rate.¹³

Although the prevailing background of migrant workers has indicated previous industrial experience and working experience in an industrial setting, most workers have looked on this phase as a rather limited, temporary phase. Almost all surveys carried out among migrant workers employed abroad and/or returned definitely to Turkey, indicate clearly that there is a strong dominant opinion to move over into another sector, namely the tertiary and to establish their selfemployment enterprises such as coffeehouses a barbershop, a gasoline station, a restaurant, etc. Years ago, N. Abadan had already found from her survey of 1963, carried out in Federal Germany among 496 Turkish workers, that among these workers, who had made up their minds about future projects, 58.9 % had opted for small business and only 1.4 % wanted to take up agrarian, 13 % industrial work.¹⁴ Over the years, with the increasing number of migrant workers from rural backgrounds the desire to invest in farming equipment and return to the village has increased to some extent, but still the predominant pattern is to be able to settle in the service sector.

This trend has to be underlined and defined as an outspoken dislike and animosity toward industrial work, the industrial setting and industrial work discipline. The fact that inspite the unrelentless insistence of the State Planning Organization to attribute priority to development projects favouring industrialization, Turkey's economy has not been able to reduce its high degree of unemployment. (It fluctuates constantly around 1.5 million according to official figures and certainly reaches a higher figure if figures on disguised unemployment are added.) No doubt this high percentage of unemployment as well as the reluctance of Turkish employers to hire migrant workers reduces the willingness of Turkish workers to re-enter the world of industry. But there seem to be many more important factors to be tackled.

(13) Mario NIKOLINAKOS, *Politische Ökonomie der Gastarbeiterfrage*, Hamburg 1973, P. 149.

(14) Nermin ABADAN, *Batı Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri ve Sorunları*, DPT Ankara 1964, P. 80.

Another important reason for this disinterest has been attributed by O. Neuloh and his collaborators to the lack of governmental or trade unionist initiative to back seriously the setting up of workers enterprises and to integrate the external labour force in newly founded industrial enterprises. In other words, O. Neuloh maintains that the nature of structural unemployment which prevails in developing countries and which differs fundamentally from conjunctural unemployment situations, results in a certain motivation toward work in general. It explains also why workers as long as they are abroad do not want to change their jobs, even if they are undesirable and unpleasant. This tendency has been confirmed by the findings of the Turkish Employment Office. According to their periodical surveys, 54.7 % in 1967, 54.6 % in 1968, 46.6 % in 1969 declared a desire to keep the same job.¹⁵ O. Neuloh explains this prevailing disinterest toward change of job and eventually professional promotion by the rating of the job itself. As long as workers consider industrial employment only as a temporary occupation which will help them to accumulate savings as rapidly as possible, any interest in change within the status of industrial employment appears senseless.

TABLE II

Desire concerning change of existing job among Turkish migrant workers

	In the same enterprise %	Elsewhere %
Do not want another job	40.5	25.8
Desire another job without status change (more comfortable, higher income, less tiresome)	20.8	32.5
Desire another job with status change	2.4	3.1
Preference for a specific profession	25.8	30.1
Other answers	10.5	9.5
	100.0	100.1

Source : O. Neuloh, H. L. Kraener, G. Endruweit, **Industrialisierung u. Gastarbeit**, P. 123.

(15) İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu, **Yurt Dışındaki İşçiler**, No. 59, V, P. 13.

Since financial motivation remains the predominant factor for the departure of migrant workers - this rated according to an SPO survey 92 % among rural, 73 % among urban workers - the migrant workers' preference for self-employment and dislike for wage employment not only explains their attitudes while employed abroad, but also the option they espouse after their return.

The balance sheet of the last 15 years clearly indicates that among the unseen input sources of Turkey's finances, the remittances, which helped to close in 1974 63.5 % of the trade deficit, became one of the most important sustaining pillars of Turkey's economy. Furthermore, savings kept abroad by Turkish migrant workers continually preoccupy the mind of responsible authorities and planners. As revealed through a survey of the German Employment Organization, 49 % of all Turkish migrant workers kept abroad a savings account with mean yearly savings totaling up to D.M. 4.260.¹⁶ Thus, the question which has remained so far unsolved is the following one: given the preference of migrant workers to establish themselves as selfemployer in the informal sector, has any government attempted to channel these savings into areas which could generate new openings for employment and production and could enlarge the scope of industrialization?

Administrative schemes for repatriation: Workers enterprises and village development cooperatives

The two major «participatory» type of investments which have been encouraged by the previous governments are the a) **joint industrial partnership**, in which workers abroad invest their savings so as to form a company in which they can eventually work on their return to turkey and the b) **village development cooperatives**.

Before the halt of recruitment in 1973, the FRG government had already tried to undertake some measures to facilitate the reabsorption of migrant workers. An agreement to this effect signed in December 1972 promised mutual efforts and technical

(16) Auslaendische Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland. Ihr Geldtransfer in die Heimatlaender und ihre Ersparnisse in der BDR, **Monatsbericht der Deutschen Bundesbank**, April 1974.

aid for the training of returning workers in the field of management as well as the extension of credit for the setting up of independent ventures. In this line the Institute for Development Research and Social Planning of the University of Saarbrücken, ISOPLAN, was entrusted to make an inventory of workers companies founded in FRG.

ISOPLAN identified three principal type of initiatives culminating in the setting up of a workers' company: 1) Enterprises sponsored by enthusiastic workers from the same home region, usually employed in the same concern, 2) Turkish students or Turks holding constant jobs such as interpreters, etc. who amass support for a worker company and collect capital for shares, 3) Turks coming from Turkey to Germany with the exclusive purpose of soliciting the help of countrymen in founding an industrial enterprise. As a rule enterprises of category 1) remained unfulfilled dreams, while projects of category 3) provided the legal ground for defrauding workers of their money.

While some 200 industrial partnership companies were established by workers abroad, at the end of 1973 only 23 workers companies were duly registered in Turkey. Out of them 10 had realized a project, 7 were involved in project planning and 6 were not yet active because all of the shareholders were still abroad. An inventory of the 17 projects in or beyond the blueprint stage revealed that 8 were located in the most developed area of Turkey surrounding the Marmara Sea (Istanbul and Balıkesir) and the other 9 were set in Central Anatolia (Ankara, Kırşehir, Yozgat, Kayseri and Niğde). Their distribution represents with some accuracy the distribution of the bulk of Turkish migrants. No worker company had attempted to stretch out toward the underdeveloped eastern regions.¹⁷

Although the State Planning Organization decided from 1973 on to extend a free service of «feasibility studies» for potential partnership companies, the results so far cannot be qualified as encouraging. The present stagnation seems, to be the result of both technical and political factors. From the technical point of

(17) ISOPLAN, *Türkische Arbeitnehmergeellschaften in der BDR*, Institut für Entwicklungsforschung und Sozialplanung, Saarbrücken, 1973

view it has to be underlined that the most relevant obstacles preventing a further increase of these enterprises seem to be : a) Poor credit facilities, unwillingness of major banks to reinforce the nominal capital of these enterprises, b) lack of stock market, c) shortage of managerial skill and technical advice, c) difficulty of elaborating feasibility projects fitting the regional and local preferences of future shareholders, e) excessively restrictive customs regulations preventing the import of technical equipment.

It also has to be added that the diffusion of political power due to coalition governments prevents the elaboration of clear cut policies delineating criterias for the selection of investment projects tending to coordinate regional development. Because of the lack of such a national policy, only successful individual initiatives such as the credit extension of the European Investment Bank to YİBİTAŞ, a workers partnership founded in Yozgat which is expected to produce yearly 500.000 Tons cement and create 270 new jobs in the city of Yozgat, can be recorded. Such results are due largely to new types of political brokers, who acting as middlemen between national and international administrations and the workers manage to obtain selected grants and facilities.¹⁸ This short evaluation indicates that the assumption that solely the goodwill of a group of workers desiring to invest, the backing of one or two innovative and energetic group leaders as well as modest starting capital is sufficient to overcome the hurdles of an underdeveloped economic system is doubtless extremely naive.

Similar observations can be made in regard to the village development cooperatives. Initially devised as a new form to send migrant workers and obtain their financial commitment for the financing of relevant local development projects, the outcome is not very promising. At the beginning between 1963-1966 the goals and work programs of these coops were left to the imagination, initiative and discretion of the rather uninformed peasants. Since simple membership and a modest down payment was sufficient for an exemption to remain on the waiting list of potential mig-

(18) Nermin ABADAN-UNAT, Migration through the eyes of political parties, trade unions, employer associations and bureaucracy in ABADAN-UNAT, R. KELEŞ, H. van RENSELAAR, L. PENNING, L. van VELZEN and L. YENİSEY, **Migration and Development**. p. 98.

rants, an incredible proliferation of those coops took place. After a freezing of their number early in 1966 at 298, followed by a ban to establish new ones, this policy was lifted in 1968 and new requirements were added. Next to a gradual increase in the financial participation per person up to 32.000 TL., the Ministry of Rural Affairs started to require detailed feasibility projects. Since the concept of «village development cooperatives» was less developed in the mind of their members whose major motivation has rather been to seek ways and means for a speedier migration procedure, a new kind of intermediary institution began to prosper. The required feasibility projects were largely carried out by private «consulting firms», usually established by former civil servants. Thus obtaining a job abroad on the basis of recognized membership in a village development cooperative actually turned out to be a rather expensive way to secure a job abroad. Additional problems of these cooperatives actually turned out to be the difficulty to obtain the completion of the pledged financial contribution, the pressure which comes from those members of the cooperative who are not recruited abroad and the control of these cooperatives. At present some 10.000 cooperatives have been registered in almost every Turkish province, but only 740 of these cooperatives have ratified projects. The table below indicates the actual size of these coops, the number of their members and those members employed abroad.

TABLE III

**Number of Village Coops which were given Priority for
Jobs in Foreign Countries by Years and by Membership
(1965 - 1974)**

Years	Number of Coops	Total number of members	Number of members sent to foreign countries
1965-1973	779	32.606	21.361
1974 (Jan.-July)	181	5.884	1.162

Source : **Work and Manpower Bulletin**, 1974, Table 25.

This table shows that administrative guidance, technical expertise and individual financial contribution have helped to find industrial jobs abroad for almost two thirds of the acknowledged coope members. Thus the function of becoming a basis for privileged recruitment seems to over shadow the basic function of cooperatives.¹⁹

The experience of the past years indicates that the greatest change for a successful operation of such village development cooperatives lies in the direction of some kind of «agro-industrial» type of institution, requiring a minimum capital of about 5 Million TL. In addition its employment generating capacity depends from the degree it will become interrelated with an overall governmental policy based upon a nationwide cooperative movement. Otherwise the vitality of such projects remains confined to individual talents in organizing and realising local initiative. In other words such an organisation instead of securing to the community involved some additional economic opportunities, enhances the leader of such projects with more social prestige and status. The vehicle of community development actually becomes an elevator for increased individual social mobility.²⁰

A recent study carried out in Boğazlıyan, a subdistrict of the province of Yozgat, has shown in a very detailed way, that migration has contributed largely to enlarging non-earned family incomes, which in turn were spent on consumer goods. One of the noticeable side effects of this process, seems to be the «pseudo-emancipation» of female family members who are left behind, they now are able to act independently in terms of purchasing, furnishing, clothing, etc. However, the financial independence secured and thus promoting the formation of more nuclear families may come suddenly to a short end. Because it is not the outcome of organic structural change and continuous industriali-

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- (19) Nermin ABADAN-UNAT, Turkish Migration to Europe: A Balance Sheet (1960-1975 in N. ABADAN-UNAT and contributors, **Turkish Workers in Europe**, A Socio-Economic Reappraisal, Leiden 1976, E. J. Brill, P. 28.
- (20) Nermin ABADAN-UNAT, «Turkish External Migration and Social Mobility» in BENEDICT, P., TÜMERTEKİN, E., MANSUR, F., **Turkey: Geographical and Social Perspectives** Leiden 1974, E. J. Brill.

zation of a region. With it many social changes started may again fall back. As Suzanne Paine correctly observes, the proportion of migrant workers' repatriated saving which have been invested in producer goods has been disappointingly low as compared with governmental hopes and there is little reason to expect any substantial improvement in the future.²¹

The question whether in case of the creation of a «People's Sector» which next to public and private enterprise, would be shouldering economic activities able to be self supporting through the solidarity of their members and an interlinked organisational network, such as a union of cooperatives, trade unions, workers enterprises, remains so far due to its preliminary phase an unsolved item.

The concept of the «People's Sector» has gained ground especially since the short-lived coalition government of the RPP and NSP in 1974. The discussions about its meaning, definition and implementation will no doubt continue. Meanwhile some encouraging although sporadic experiments are showing that under certain conditions, the initiative of motivated workers, technicians and local population is indeed able to create large scale industrial projects. Although such experiments still remain exceptions, they are nevertheless proof of the potential dynamism inherent in this philosophy of economic cooperation.

Recently an excellent case study on the foundation and evolution of a large chemical industrial complex, formally entitled the EKSTAŞ Holding company, located in Şerefli Koçhisar a town in the province of Ankara, provides very instructive insight into the social forces which might be mobilized for employment generating projects. Şerefli Koçhisar represents both the subdistrict of Ankara province with the highest percentage of migrant workers (the proportion of the migrants compared to the population of the subdistrict is 120.3 %) and also has registered so far the highest number of returned workers. The first part of this industrial complex has been completed and is producing at 70 % of capacity. The blueprints for see the production of 17 varieties of chemical products. The factory is expected to provide 2.000 new

(21) Suzanne PAINE, *op. cit.*, P. 147.

jobs. The idea was started by 25 workers, all from the village of Sarıyahşi, in 1970. The original capital of 280.000 TL in 1970 was raised through systematic efforts to 50 Million TL in 1975. The machinery used has been produced exclusively in Turkey, part of it even designed by Turkish engineers. In order to avoid after the «take off» a domination of local or national big capital, interesting provisions have been included in the statutes. No person may hold more than 10 shares; selling or turning over of stock can only be done with the specific permission of the executive board. Two kinds of shares were issued: «A» type only available for migrant workers who pay in foreign currency, «B» type for small savings owners within Turkey, to be paid in Turkish currency. At present 2.562 workers own «A» type shares. This indicates the strong interest and confidence of the migrant workers abroad in the functioning, of the industrial setup²². Such examples prove once more that in order to sever the one-sided dependence of the excessive Turkish manpower from external labour markets, systematic efforts and large-scale, well designed, efficient governmental guidance, credit extension and support are necessary. Since these efforts have so far not been coordinated, the general picture is of an outspoken preference to invest the savings of migrant workers both abroad and returned in small businessess or real estate. The reasons are multiple but perhaps the most important lies in the fact that both workers companies and village development co-operatives have tapped only an insignificant fraction of a vast, potential source for domestic investment. The estimates rate some 5 billion DM as kept in German banks. Furthermore, only a small number of Turkish workers who hold shares in joint stock corporations can realistically hope to find employment in these corporations upon their return home. Finally, one should not forget that the sudden stop in recruitment has created in Western Europe a new situation: instead of planning for the sound re-integration, the labour importing countries now are trying to assimilate the present foreign labour force.

(22) İbrahim YASA and H. Sami GÜVEN, Yurt Dışında Çalışan İşçilerimizin Yaygın Tabanlı Halk Girişimciliğine Katkıları: Şereflikoçhisar Örneği: *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 1975, P. 111.

Summing up

The multifaceted aspects of Turkey's external migration reflect only one case study of a series of transitional processes, affecting both agrarian and industrial countries. The degree of interdependence of such a complex relationship can be measured under different lights: terms of trade, transfer of certain technologies, flow of monetary and human capital as well as information, impact of multinational corporations. It is impossible to evaluate the migratory movement as an independent variable on the contrary, this process represents a dependent variable, subject to cyclical economic movements. The most undeniable feature of this process lies in its **asymmetric** character. The validity of this assertion can be tested by considering the following types of interaction :

- Interaction between labour markets of sending and receiving countries
- Impact of educational systems,
- Transfer of foreign currency,
- Conception of economic development plans,
- Determination of migratory policies.

Except for the transfer of foreign currency - and even here the strong impact for consumption of commodities produced in foreign countries prevails - all the above cited factors are imposed by strongly industrialized «center» countries on the less developed «periphery» countries.

Therefore the question raised by a great number of economists and migration experts is as valid today as it was yesterday: does the migration of workers also contribute to the growth of the emigration countries? Arguments and evidence support the conclusion that *laissez faire* emigration - by which a government steered but not thoroughly planned migratory policy is meant serves the perpetuation of underdevelopment.

In order to escape a growing gap between the manpower exporting and importing countries, a number of well controlled alternatives (restricted inflow of capital, selective specialization in

some labour intensive industries and selective utilization of labour intensive production methods) may prove to be useful for the growth of the emigration countries, but only insofar as they primarily satisfy the conditions for the emergence of independent economic development.

Looking on the same problem from the individual point of view, one should not forget that the «de facto» segregation of the migrant workers in general and the Turkish workers in particular, places them among the European sub-proletariat. This compels them to almost complete submission before their employers. However this submissive position generates a desire for change once returned home. A new type of worker, the «worker/employer» is emerging, a man with great social and geographical mobility, who is able to accomplish temporarily unpleasant jobs on one side and who at the same time tries to overcome his initial low social rank by quickly entering the newly emerging middle classes.