

The Socio-Economic Aspects of Return Migration in Turkey

by

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## Introduction

Among the sending countries of the Mediterranean no doubt Turkey, - a late comer on the scene of international migration, - is both confronted with substantial returns of the first generation migrants, who went to look for better wages and new chances in the early 60's as well as an ongoing out-migration due to family reunion and limited job opportunities. In the space of fifteen years, from 1970 to 1985, the intensity, content and geography of migration from the Southern countries to the more industrialized countries in the North have undergone very substantial changes. These may be summed up as follows: a massive reduction in the transfers of permanent labor, an increase in flows of non-working population, a reduction in Greek, Spanish and to a lesser extent Italian emigration in North-West Europe.

In this respect three types of migration as related to regional types can be identified:

- a. Countries with a falling migratory potential (Greece, Spain, Italy)
- b. Countries with still high migratory potential (Portugal and Yugoslavia)
- c. Country with a very high migratory potential: Turkey

As G. Simon rightly points out, of all countries in OECD Europe, Turkey has experienced the greatest surge of emigration to Western Europe since 1970-73 and has the highest departure potential of anywhere on the southern coast of Europe. The migratory thrust may be summed up in two figures: about 660,000 Turkeys in Europe in 1971-72, over 2 million in 1985. This threefold increase occurred against a theoretically discouraging background for migration and inspite of the return of over 400,000 migrants since the beginning of the 1980's. It reflects both the extent of family reunification and the high fertility of Turkish families abroad and also the ability of this new working-class emigration to adapt to an economic situation that had become difficult (G. Simon, 1987:268).

Another proof of adaptability is provided by the development to other second-choice settlement centers. The increase in the Turkish population is noticeable in France (53,000 in 1975, 123,000 in 1982), where Turks are both the youngest community (one out of every two Turks is under 30) and the most recent arrivals (41% lived outside of France in 1975). Their dependency ratio 3.34 is the highest of all alien groups. There was also a large increase in Belgium (80,000 in 1982) and the Netherlands (71,000, 1975, 155,000 in 1983) and also in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden. The numbers recorded in these countries increased by over 300,000 from 1975 to 1983. This extension and diversification of Turkish migration, which in 1970 was highly concentrated on Federal Republic of Germany, are among the striking features of the new migratory trend. The spreading out of Turkish migration has partly been caused by the military intervention of 1980 and explains the relative high number of political asylum seekers. According to the official figures published by the Turkish Ministry of Labor in 1980, 57,913 Turks representing 53% of total asylum seekers, applied to the German authorities for asylum. This situation caused ultimately for changes in the legal procedure of asylum seeking in Federal Germany. It might be assumed that a substantial party of these asylum seekers have used this way to secure employment, thus, representing pseudo-asylum requests. Nevertheless the radical changes which took place after the military intervention of September 12, 1980 in Turkey induced a non-negligible number of political activists to apply for asylum abroad.

The major factors which makes Turkey as the main reservoir for potential migration can be summed up as follows: its high rate of natural increase (average annual increase over ten years: 2.2) the saturation of the employment market - 16.5% of unemployment and 58% of the working population being located in agriculture - an escalating inflation and the great discrepancy of the standard of living between Turkey and the receiving European countries.

This potential explains also the relative high presence of Turkish workers in oil producing countries in 1984:

Workers stock on oil producing countries from Souther Europe in 1984

Turkey	250,000
Yugoslavia	40,000
Italy	30,000
Spain	30,000
Greece	10,000
Portugal	10,000

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370,000

Source: J. Widgren, International Migration - New Challenges to Europe, Strasbourg, 1987, p.10

Presently there is a considerable outflow of returning migrant workers from the oil-producing countries due to the fall in oil prices and new restrictions in regard of immigration. As regards Turkey migration to oil-producing countries reached a peak in 1981, but is now diminishing.

Emigration from Turkey to oil-producing countries

<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1984</u>
21,000	55,000	45,000

Source: J. Widgren, op. cit., p.10

1. Return: a myth or reality?

Considering the still ongoing diversified out-migration of Turkey, the nature of the return movement has to be carefully assessed. According to German statistics, homeward flows surged in 1975 and 1976 (148,000 and 130,000 departures), then fell , levelling off in 1979 and 1980 (66,000 and 70,000) to pick up sharply again two years ago (86,000 in 1982, 100,000 in 1983, 90,000 in the first six months of 1985) (Widgren, 1987:33).

However, even statistics like these hide the truth. Most returns are cyclical in their nature, and many those who seem to have returned, re-enter the country of immigration again after some time. Many go into the independent economic sector. This re-entry movement into the tertiary sectors of immigration countries also indicates a process of permanently settling down in Western Europe. Family reunification over the last ten years, childbearing in the host country, the growth of new generations born or brought up and educated in the host country, have settled these populations more firmly making any idea of returning for good even more remote.

Thus, return movements have to be evaluated under the light of present conditions which are summarized by J.Widgren as follows:

- the family reunion process of the guest workers of the 1960s and early 1970s was completed around 1980 and the guest workers and their children are gradually becoming permanent settlers; and this is happening during a period of declining population growth in northern Europe;
- the idea of permanent return to southern Europe has been replaced by life-long short-term commuting between countries of settlement and countries of origin;
- the situation of ex-guest workers is characterized by increasing living standards but also by high unemployment, considerable difficulties experienced by the "second generation" in entering the labor market, and rising tendencies towards xenophobia; and this is occurring in spite of the economic recovery during recent years;
- immigration to the most industrialized European countries remains at a high level due to the general internationalization of European societies and to third world pressure, eg. by asylum seekers;
- the process of European integration has been reinforced, and the common labor market of the European community will gradually encompass large parts of southern Europe;

- southern Europe is now increasingly experiencing immigration pressures from non-European countries to the same extent as northern European countries, and the classical dichotomy between receiving and sending countries in Europe no longer exists;
- the "employment safety-valve" which the expanding middle East oil-producing economies have provided for Mediterranean emigrants since the mid-1970s is now being drastically reduced due to falling oil prices;
- the whole OECD-area is increasingly experiencing third world migratory pressures in the long-term perspective, and immigration control measures have recently been reinforced in several countries (Widren, 1987:6).

## 2. Organized and individually determined return

With the sudden stop of recruitment on behalf of the European major industrial countries the problem of return, coined as "re-integration" by administrators of host countries, becomes an extensively discussed, analyzed and on behalf of politicians, mostly, encouraged, alternative, policy model. This trend obliges us at first to distinguish between: a) Officially encouraged, public policy related incentives for the definite return of the migrant worker and his family. These incentives have been implemented due to closing up of major industrial firms and created an almost obligatory return situation; b) Individual or family scale returns depending more on personal preferences and timing. In both cases the most relevant role exercised during the decision-making phase is the evaluation and visualization of the economy of the home country. Although a significant number of personal motivated reasons might have induced the migrant to opt for a drastic change of his working and living place - the major push factor still remains the lack of available jobs, unemployment in the receiving country. The dream to achieve in a lifetime a major improvement in one's own standard of living, the hopes attached to substantial savings, the expectations attached to a lucrative business to be set up after return, have been the major motivation to go abroad. These strongly economical oriented

reflections, which kept to dominate the working and savings attitudes of the migrants while abroad logically are also playing a determining role in regard of their intention to return.

While during the very early stages of Turkish migration the expectations to be able to find easily a proper job were relatively very high - 65% in 1963 (Abadan, 1964:89), they declined already after the recession of 66/67 and have continued to be low particularly in comparison with the other migrants in Europe. Investigating the degree of preference of the influx of foreigners Böhning has drawn the attention to the intriguing difference between migrant nationalities. In Federal Germany 9 out of 10 Italian, 8 out of 10 Spanish, 7 out of 10 Greeks, five out of 10 Yugoslav and only 3 out of 10 Turkish workers did return in the early 80's (Böhning, 1984:123-162).

### 2.1 Organized return

The ongoing flow of remittances, although tending to diminish, are reflecting a potential return, since they are the result of decisions by individuals to put their money in the banks of sending rather than receiving countries. They also represent the attentions, care devoted for the well being and living expenses of the left behind. Nevertheless, the sheer fact to send larger sums to the home country for other purposes than to meet immediate needs, does not mean that by these financial transactions new employment opportunities have been created. This is why Turkey due to its constitutionally anchored economic social and cultural development plans covering each time a five year period, was the first country to attempt to channel remittances into productive projects.

A scheme for village development co-operatives was established as far as 1963, and in 1972 Turkey and Germany signed an agreement on assistance to the "Arbeitnehmergesellschaften" (workers enterprise) of Turkish workers living in Germany and investing in Turkey. In 1975 Turkey founded the State Industry and

Worker Investment Bank (DESIYAB), aiming at delivering credit loans to firms established by Turkish workers abroad. Up to now, more than 4,900 jobs have been created in this way, and a further 2,400 jobs due to these loan-giving systems.

The development of measures of this kind in Turkey runs parallel to those undertaken in Germany. A new agreement between the two countries provides for a special fund which will make loans to former migrant workers. Moreover, in 1983 Germany enacted a law to promote the willingness of foreigners to return to their countries of origin. This law was unique since it was intended to expire very quickly, and it did so on 30 June 1984. It provided for assistance towards the return of foreigners who were either unemployed or threatened with unemployment. Each returnee received 10,500 DM plus 1,500 DM for each child. Altogether 13,700 foreigners took advantage of this provision. In addition, Turkish (and Portuguese) workers were able to receive back their employer's contribution to the social security fund: 120,000 foreigners (including 93,000 Turks and 14,000 Portuguese) took advantage of this. Repatriation assistance was also granted to those who had been on short-time work for six or more months, some 16,833 foreign workers, of whom 14,459 (86% were Turks) applied for assistance under the scheme. Altogether nearly 300,000 foreigners, mostly Turks, left Germany taking advantage of the financial inducement policy.

France also tried to implement policies to encourage migrants to return, but these attempts have had little or no impact. The low amount granted was the major reason of its lack of popularity. The incentives adopted in 1977 took the form of a FF 10,000 grant to every migrant worker having resided more than five years in France 5,000 per member of the family. In 1984 a more substantial inducement to return was offered at between 700,000 and 100,000 FF (Secombe et al., 1986:39).

Finally international organizations such as the Council of Europe have also attempted through the European Resettlement Fund to reduce regional disparities by extending loans aiming at regional development and job creation. So far the



Fund has contributed to the creation of 40,000 jobs in sending countries, including 25,000 in Spain, 9,000 in Italy and 4,000 in Turkey.

With lower living standards and a higher unemployment rate in Turkey than in other northern Mediterranean labor exporting countries, there has been little incentive to return home. The percentage reduction in the number of Turkish workers employed in the EEC states during 1973-74 was in general well below that for immigrant workers of other nationalities. During this period, the fall in the number of Turks employed in the EEC was only 9% of the total employed in 1973, whereas the comparable percentage for Italian immigrant workers was 18% for Greeks 17%, for Yugoslavs 19% Spaniards 12%.

In recent years there has been an increase in the rate of return from Federal Germany. In 1982 about 70,000 Turks returned home, 100,000 in 1983 and 120,000 in 1984. The increase in return migration reflects the continuing recession in Western Europe. By March 1984 due to growing unemployment in Federal Germany, policy was centered upon the encouragement of return migration (SOPEMI 1984:34-35).

However, it seems imperative to remind that the huge network of human and material bonds that has been established between receiving and sending countries have changed the guest workers of yesterday into life-long short-term commuters of tomorrow; the first generation and to some extent the second too, will live with one foot in both countries. This tendency reduces the attractiveness of massive, induced organized returns.

## 2.2 The non-organized, individual return

Although the percentage of returning Turks appears to be lower than the other foreign migrants working in Europe there has been a continuing stream of returning migrants in recent years. Who are they? Do they represent different characteristics than the earlier returnees? What has been the choice of settlement, investment, mode of life?

At this point it should be reminded that at the very beginning of Turkey's planned "export of excessive manpower", the assumption was centered around the hypothesis that a temporary entrance into the world of highly organized industrial production will enable the Turkish worker to acquire new skills and knowledge and thus provide Turkish economy upon their return the necessary pool of trained labor force. This assumption proved to be to a very large extent an unrealized myth. Neither the workers who went abroad and whose first ambition was to secure fast accumulations of savings, nor the type of employment offered within the European job market could have secured the expected educational gains. Furthermore the dream of almost every migrant worker to set up his own independent business upon return was much more stronger than the alternative to re-enter the industrial sector. A study carried out as early as 1967 (Kayser, 1967) following the recession in Federal Germany, shows that during a sudden and massive economic crisis, Turkish workers preferred to take up refuge with their countrymen employed in sectors untouched by the recession rather than to return to the home country. They displayed a lack of trust toward the labor market in the home country and refused to identify themselves with the Turkish wage-earning class. This tendency of a refusal to take up industrial occupation in the home country has been defined by Abadan-Unat as the "proletarian/boss" role model in which the migrant worker tries to overcome his frustrations and complex of inferiority due to the obligation to perform dirty, risky and prestigless work abroad by switching over to the role of land or real estate, small-scale business ownership or renter at home (Abadan, 1972:293).

Next to this psychological predisposition, the spatial background and the age group he belongs plays a decisive role in shaping his attitudes and orientation toward his own society. In reality, and the point has to be stressed, returning migrants resettle in a much more flexible and complex way than is generally realized within what we may call the "composite" Mediterranean economy in which the individual, often of rural origin, simultaneously combines

earnings from a small agricultural holding or a small business with less readily admitted earnings from undeclared work in a community where families have several forms of employment. Returning migrants seems to prefer to combine part-time farming usually by leasing their land to others and building links with rural industry and commerce.

### 3. Two types of returnees: the "early" and the "late" returning migrants

#### 3.1. The "early" returnees

The process of return although being a constant element feature of the international migratory flow, demands a sharp distinction in regard of timing. There is a relevant difference between the relative low, sporadic return of migrants who went abroad in the early 60's and 70's and the relative high number of returnees in the 80's. While the first wave was predominantly male, married but have lived abroad in dormitories by themselves, the second group choose to return after family reunification has taken place. The first category represents the "early", the second the "late" returnees.

In case of the first category as reflected in the various surveys (Tuna, 1966) State Planning Organization SPO., 1971; Abadan-Uhat et al., 1975; Yasa, 1979; Gitmez, 1979) the dominant trait appears to be the inability of the migrant's to adjust to industrial life and for those of rural origin, to return to their original villages. Most of the "early" returning migrants declared to have returned for family reasons - but in reality individual disillusionment, inability to master the requirements of a rigid division of labor and time schedule seems to have played the decisive role in their decision to give up the much desired job abroad. Although a substantial majority have wanted to set up a business of some sort, in fact most have failed to do so. Those who put their savings in industrial joint ventures with a view to set up a factory (and working in it) on their return were mostly defrauded of their money abroad. Those who went abroad through the agricultural cooperative scheme often failed to keep up

their dues and few imported machinery under the concession scheme (Abadan-Unat). Without generalizing too much one may say that this group bears the greatest resemblance with the return of failure or conservatism as described in detail by F. Cerase (Cerase, F., 1984).

The "early" returnees generally represent an unsuccessful attempt to individuals born, raised and socialized in rural areas, who were unable to adjust themselves to an alien industrial urban environment, thus preferred to return where their roots lies - to the villages. This return enabled some of them to regain a prestige, respect among their peers and gain social status. However, this upward mobility creates also envy and jealousy so that quite a few of these returnees finally opt as place of residence some small towns of the same region in order to escape intensive gossip and social group on behalf of the peers in the village of their origin. The survey of Gitmez of 1979 indicates that among returnees from the three central provinces of Anatolia, namely Afyon, Kirsehir and Bursa, 35% choose to live in a provincial center, 15% in provincial district town and 50% in villages (Gitmez, 1979:175).

However, the relevant feature of this return to rural areas lies in the fact that these returnees are not interested in increasing agricultural production or mechanization, they are not desirous to work as farmers on the land they acquired. They prefer to lease their land. There is a clear cut increase in regard of land ownership on behalf of returnees, but a decline in the numbers of active farmers.

A study on the impact of international migration on a district - Bogazliyan in the province of Yozgat, Central Anatolia and its surrounding 38 villages (Abadan-Unat, et al., 1975) had indicated that return migrants have made no tangible contribution to the economic development of Bogazliyan by using training and experience acquired abroad; the majority of them departed from Turkey as unskilled workers in the agrarian sector and most come back without any new skills. The intensive flow of money into the district has produced a significant

improvement in the standard of living in migrant's households, manifested especially in a greater variety of better quality foods, clothing and household furnishings. However, increased consumer demand arising from additional purchasing power has been particularly profitable for the old group of businessmen and only secondarily to return migrants (R. Penninx, 1983: 801).

Finally almost three-quarters of all respondents in the above cited surveys were thinking of going abroad again inspite of their first frustrating experiences.

### 3.2 The "late" returnees

Systematic efforts to encourage return migration as well as growing xenophobia in Europe resulted in a much larger return movement in the 80's. This movement has also influenced by the anxiety of some very conservative families, who opted for a return in order to prevent the second generation, particularly their daughters, to enter into a mixed marriage or even getting settled down for good abroad. For this group almost all the seven categories mentioned by Rogers such as positive changes in the country of origin, events at home requiring the presence of the migrant dissatisfaction in the country of residence, family needs, realization that sacrifices done so far are too great, conviction that needs can be better satisfied at home apply in order to explain their motivation for return (Rogers, 1969).

A very recent survey carried out by the University of Bursa in Bursa a province representing Turkey's fastest developing industrial center, indicated that among the new returnees one finds a relative high percentage of migrants qualified for pension rights, representatives of the second generation who came back due to parental decision and authority - often against their will - and a non negligible group of person belonging to the age category of 31-40 (24%), desirous to re-enter the job market in Turkey. The distinctive characteristic of this last group is a long stay abroad (42% over 10 years), high skill level

(73%), industrial work experience initially acquired in the home country (75%). These returnees have opted for very different alternatives upon their return 44.26% have returned to industry and are at present wage-earning workers, 34.43% have founded an independent business of their own and 21.31% are benefitting of pension or rent (Bursa Survey, 1986: Table 38).

### 3.21 The occupational status of "late" returnees

The survey of Bursa of 1986 reflects the big change which goes parallel with the fast trend of regional industrialization taking place in the Bursa area, where Turkey's automobile, spare parts and textile industries are concentrated. The degree of satisfaction as measured to the alternative of re-emigrating reveals an interesting split.

Table 1: Status of returnees and willingness to re-emigrate in %

Do you want to become	Status	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Total</u>
a migrant worker once	worker in home industry	23.0	21.1	44.1
more?	Enterprise owner	10.5	24.0	34.5
	Unemployed or retired	<u>13.5</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>21.4</u>
		47.0	53.0	100.0 =

Source: Bursa Survey, 1986, Table 48

The relative high satisfaction lies in the fact that about 57% considers their savings as sufficient and 40% feel satisfied to be able to make full use of their skills acquired abroad.

### 3.22 Reasons for return

While the majority of the returnees in the 70's explained their return with personal reasons such as inability or unwillingness to adjust, illegal status, illness or accident, the "late" returnees of the 80's have been more affected by the structural factors pertinent to the receiving countries as well as the concern in regard of the education and future of their children.

Table 2: Major reason for return in Bursa Survey 1986 in %

Unemployment in the receiving country	10.8
Xenophobia, hostile social climate	10.5
Collective decision of all family members	7.5
Nostalgia	8.9
Education and schooling of the children	23.0
Health and occupational illness	5.9
Setting up of personal business in Turkey	8.9
Return encouraging policies, acquisition of pension rights	4.3
Refuse of prolongation of work of work and/or permit	11.5
	100.0

Source, Bursa Survey 1986: Table 32

The above cited reasons are indicating that 38% are related to the host countries policies and attitudes affecting migrants. Analyzing the cited reasons further, it should not surprise that the education and schooling of children occupies such a relevant place (23%). The various difficulties faced by the second generation in Europe in terms of achieving an upward mobility through the educational ladder and acquiring professional skills are increasingly more understood by the parents, who themselves have created and lived in a kind of subculture, but do not want their children to remain in the enclave of the ghetto mentality and particularly to belong to the working class.

The second relevant factor such as unemployment gains a different importance when measured with the time spend abroad, accordingly a) a prolonged stay abroad diminishes the impact of unemployment where as b) migrants with a short stay abroad or second generation migrants who want to enter the job market but not

exercising manual work are more affected by unemployment. Especially the younger generation has very hard time when they are faced with the competition of indigenous teenagers.

The major reasons for returnees for not wanting to re-enter the labor market on a wage - earning contract basis are as follows:

- a) The determination to realize a change in social status,
- b) The image they will project on their peer groups
- c) The acquisition of pension rights (at home or abroad) thus stepping outside of the job market,
- d) Deteriorated health conditions due to heavy working conditions abroad,
- e) High unemployment at home, low wages insufficient accident and professional illness prevention and heavy working conditions in the home country
- f) The unwillingness of women with work experience abroad to re-enter the job market due to family obligations and discouraging social climate

### 3.23 Re-entering industry at home

The reasons for a group of "late" returnees to function as industrial workers in their home country is reflected in the Bursa survey as follows:

- a) Insufficient savings (34.3%)
- b) Failure in setting up an independent business (7.4%)
- c) Obligation to take up wage work (41.0%)
- d) Desire to make use of the acquired professional skills and experiences (5.2%)
- e) Desire to work (9.7%)



Table 3: Distribution of returnees according age and occupational status in %

Distribution of age	Status: Worker	Self-employed	Retired or job seeking	Total
20 or less	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.0
21 - 30	8.9	4.6	4.3	17.7
31 - 40	14.4	7.2	2.9	24.6
41 - 50	15.4	18.0	9.5	43.0
50 and over	<u>5.2</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>13.8</u>
Total	44.3	34.4	21.3	100.0

Source: Bursa Survey, 1986: Table 40

Comparing the age groups with occupational status, we see that the bulk of self-employed remains with the 41 and over group, while re-entering industry is divided equally among the 31-40 and the 40 and over group.

For those desirous to re-enter Turkish industry, the question how much of a stay abroad contributed to the acquisition of new skills and whether this group might contribute to the general development of Turkey's economy, the answers are as follows: 60.5% have not been able to use their professional skills and experiences in Turkey; 64.2% of the returnees were employed in similar institutions as before their departure. This means that the skill drain in periods of high conjuncture in Europe has led to a high drain of skilled labor force, which consequently has not been utilized in occupations other than their first occupation at home.

An additional obstacle for re-entering in Turkish industry lies in the weak structure of the governmental job recruitment institutions. The Turkish Labor Office spend most of its efforts in placing unqualified job seekers in state economic enterprises and did not establish much connection with the private sector. Thus, only persons with determination, manifold connections and personal contacts have been able to find satisfactory employment by themselves.

Table 4: Channels of job placement for returnees

Turkish Labor Office	10.3%
Friends	28.1%
Personal efforts	40.7%
Personal relationship with employer	11.8%
Relative of employer	3.7%
Other	<u>5.10%</u>
	100.0%

Source: Bursa Survey, 1986, Table:58

### 3.24 Self-employed returnees

Setting up an independent business has been a predominant choice for returnees at large. This tendency has been reinforced over the years due to the failure of the workers enterprise and the collapse of village development cooperatives, (Abadan-Unat, 1986:389). Particularly returnees with a long stay abroad and sufficient savings have adopted this alternative (34.4%). The size of these enterprises reveals their relative limited impact in terms of creating new job opportunities.

Table 5: Size of enterprises set up by returnees in regard of personnel

No employees		22.1%	
1 - 3	"	40.3%	
4 - 6	"	19.2%	
7 - 10	"	11.5%	
10 or more		6.7%	100%

These enterprises are concentrated in small industry; 21.4% are producing consumer items, 36.9% half manufactured goods; 7.7% investment commodities; the remaining 34.5% are offering services. The major difficulties encountered by this group are as follows: Obtaining credit 27.8%; securing qualified labor force 27%; finding a suitable location 5.7%; primary material 4.8%; management 5.7%; marketing 12.5%; machine, equipment 2.8%; inflation 29.8%.

An interesting feature is the fact that almost two third of these enterprises have not applied for any credit (61.4%). This situation can be explained with an attitude of self-reliance on behalf of the returnees, believing in being able to master the situation without getting indebted. It also reflects a choice for labor-intensive projects and actually serves also as a symbol of upward mobility. There are also other reasons such as a preference for small size, a negative attitude actually a reticence for enlarging the enterprise, lack of information about the market situation due to a prolonged stay abroad, lack of knowledge about the necessary amount of capital for the building up of a lucrative business.

Another important problem resides with the problem of the scarcity of qualified labor force. On one side employers are unable to hire additional labor because the potential workers are asking too high wages (27.8%) or dislike the working conditions (12%), on the other hand available qualified work forces are not available (41.6%).

### 3.25 Job-seeking retired or unemployed returnees

The Bursa survey showed that within their sample about 10% were retired, 11% unemployed, both desirous to reenter the job market. This group faces great difficulties; 57% are searching over one year for a suitable job, 17% for 7-12 months and 25% around 0-6 months. Only 30% are ready to take an unqualified job, around 61% are looking for a qualified job, preferably as foreman. The most important obstacle for this group lies in the fact, that about 73% of all open job ads indicates an age limit of 35 and below. Another relevant factor seems to be the tendency for joint ventures founded with foreign capital, high technology and know-know, to recruit their qualified labor force right away among migrants employed abroad. The interesting point of this group of returnees, is that unlike the classical model of retirement in which the persons are satisfied with a peaceful life chosen for their old age, these "late" comers being relatively too young for an inactive life style and residing in a very fast developing urban

setting, are trying very hard to compete with the younger cohorts. This search for jobs for persons who have lived great deprivations abroad in order to accumulate some savings and upon return are neither able to built up the imagined stressless existence they were hoping to achieve, represent the most disillusioned group.

#### 4. Women returnees

The majority of the literature dealing with women migrants has focussed on those female migrants or leading a housewife life as well as the left behind family members (Abadan-Unat, 1984, 111-131). Specific studies dealing with returned women migrants are just beginning to be undertaken. So far a non published small survey carried out in two districts of the Turkish capital, Ankara, namely Demetevler and Yenimahalle, may shed some light on this topic. One of the distinctive characteristic of these women lies in the fact, that over 80% of these returnees have selected as their place of residence Ankara, the capial, a metropolitan city, although this city was not their place of origin. This indicates, that their families were looking for specific reasons when selecting their new home. Indeed the major reasons of preference was the existence of a large number of relatives and friends, a more diversified job market and better educational opportunities for their children. About 68% of the respondents were under the age of 40, 86% were married, 52% had only completed primary school, 16% secondary school and 10% high school. The overwhelming majority of these women (90%) were unemployed housewives or students prior to their departure, had all been gainfully employed abroad, but only 4% have taken up a paid job following their return. The reasons for retrieving from active work participation are health reasons (18.7%) no need to work (31%) dislike of work (18.7%), retirement (2%), childcare obligation (8.3%). The attitude toward work indicates that for the overwhelming majority of the women their stay abroad was looked upon as a transitional phase, comparable to a kind of compulsory

military service, which enabled them to accumulate savings and permit them an ascendance in their social status.

Looking at the family structure of the respondents 48% were living as a nuclear family prior to their departure, only 8% were members of an extended family. About 64% of these women went to Federal Germany between 1967-74, 32% mostly second generation migrants joined their family while staying abroad. In Germany 68% of these women were employed in industry, 28% in the service sector.

During their stay abroad these women led a rather isolated, segregated life. Their interest in regard of events happening in German society remained dismal. Only 52% were reading Turkish newspaper, 34% watched German TV programs, the mass consumption in regard of the media was Turkish video films. These programs were followed by 86.4% of the sample. The data indicates that in terms of developing ideas and values the impact of mass media in the host society remained at an almost unnoticeable level, while reinforcement of the values of the home country continued to be infused in an uninterrupted way.

In regard of integration 72% declared to have deliberately remained uninvolved with the German society. Among those who answered this question positively, fluency in speaking and dreading German occupied the first place.

Among the reasons given to explain the refusal to integrate with the host country 35% indicated their unwillingness to change their habits and behavior, 54% confessed they have been unable to establish friendly relations with Germans and to accept the norms of German society. It seems relevant to emphasize that almost all respondents stressed the fact that all their efforts was directed not to cut off their bonds with Turkish society and resist efforts tending to "Germanize" them. Yet the same group responded very positively on their experience abroad (90%); for 40% it was the opportunity to make savings, for 51% it was the possibility to enlarge one's horizon, get a new perspective on the world and new knowledge. The contradictory character of these answers can be mostly explained by the anxiousness on behalf of these women not to give the

impression they have adopted lax and permissive heterosexual habits abroad, thus losing their reputation as faithful and devoted spouses and mothers.

In spite of the above cited contradicting responses and although the level of integration has remained at its lowest level, the impact of the migratory process seems to have created certain changes. Accordingly 58% of the respondents wants to share the decision-making process with their husbands, 62% are in favor of women working outside the home. Nevertheless the traditional role model for women namely to be a mother and homemaker, remains still placed on a high pedestal. For 32% this status appears to be the primary condition to achieve a full personality. Another dimension related to equality among spouses is reflected in the negative attitude of 94% about tolerating polygamy - a form of marriage outlawed in Turkey since 1926. Changing attitudes in regard of child education seems also to have taken roots; 86% are in favor of asking the opinion of their children when intra-family matters are to be decided. The great value and importance attached to education is also reflected in almost an egalitarian preference of university education for boys (68%) and girls (66%).

Summing up it can be stated that the emancipatory impact of migration on women appears to be of limited scope, particular in those cases where women joined their husbands later, remained under a strict marital control while abroad and did not re-enter the labor market upon return. Their position appears to be more conservative than those left behind wives of migrants who during their long periods of separation acquired a certain degree of independence in conducting their own affairs.

The majority of the married migrant women who returned have shown no strong motivation to develop their abilities and make use of new knowledge and experience acquired abroad. Although women are showing a determination to shed certain traditional attitudes, the prevailing social control forces them to repress these changing attitudes .

The most important change seems to have taken place within the relationship among spouses and the decision-making process. The strong demand for upward mobility appears to lie predominantly in the sphere of conspicuous consumption, displaying expensive furniture, little or none used electrical equipments, alike.

#### 4 - The re-integration of the Turkish second generation

With an increasing amount of returning migrant families, the problem of a successful insertion of Turkish migrant children, who started their education abroad constitutes at present one of the most pressing problems in Turkey. The new type of "Alamanyali" family, similar to traditional families living in rural or "gecekondu" (squatterhouses) environment, are adamantly determined to secure their children the chances of an upward mobility. This explains why these parents are less inclined to place their children in vocational schools as encouraged in Federal German, but prefer to bring them back to Turkey, enroll them in lycées which assure the transfer into the universities, provided they are able to pass the entrance examinations. At present the Turkish government has set aside three German and Turkish teaching lycées in Istanbul one in Ankara and another in Izmir in order to grant a preferential treatment for the enrollment of children of returning migrants. The scarcity of Turkish teachers being able to teach in German has led to a bilateral agreement according which the German government provided 90 German teachers, paid by German authorities to teach in these schools and thus enabling the students to preserve and develop their acquired linguistic capacities. It is not exaggerated to say that in the near future the graduates of these lycées and of those graduates who pursue higher education will be sought after by joint ventures established with German capital. Tourism establishments dealing predominantly with foreigners will no doubt grant these youngsters better opportunities than in Federal Germany where the demands of the German school system are very high, hard to satisfy and the competition with young Germans very tough.

It is particularly the awareness of Turkish parents, that unless they return to their home country, the future of their children lies nowhere else than in vocational training - this being the best solution since the majority of Turkish teenagers leave comprehensive schools abroad without a diploma ( 62%). This awareness induces them either to return collectively or to opt for a fragmented family. A significant group of Turkish parents want to compensate for all of the frustrations and deprivations they have experienced abroad by preparing for their children a better life, a life which is not the one of an industrial worker.

Yet the choice for splitted return - mother and children in school age going back home father and adult children remaining abroad - gives way to a number of new problems. The socialization process which started in Europe creates a noticeable cultural distance between parents and children, paired with a clash of values. Young migrants who share the identity crisis of young as a whole and their difficulties in communicating with adults, also suffer very often from a state of malaise created by the ambivalent relationship between the culture of their country of origin and host country's culture. This relationship sometimes takes the form of cultural conflict due to the host country's attempts at passive assimilation and the active resistance on the part of the immigrant families whose attachment to the culture of origin is often somewhat ritualistic.

One of the most frequent subject of generational conflict is related to the relationship between sexes and its evaluation. While according Western standards teenagers have a right to establish close friendships, meet each other spend vacations together, the traditional Turkish families, faithful to the social context of Islamic values related to chastity, attempt to exercise harsh control over all types of relationships including the breaking off of correspondence even. This situation becomes even more dramatic when traditional families forge prearranged marriages resulting in the drop-out of gifted young girls from school who after their return are bound to lead a very frustrated existence.



This heavy parental control frustrates the second generation very much. In school these teenage returnees feel themselves isolated. They have a greater degree of self-confidence compared to their peer, dress differently, the dominant feature of their character is imbued with strong individualism. Because of their distinct otherness they build networks among themselves. Their choice in regard of reading and music listening also differs. It is not exaggerated to state that growing up "between two cultures" demands from the second generation greater sacrifices than it has been for their parents. They are forced to internalize a partly unknown set of norms and value systems. In addition they have to familiarize themselves with new subject matters in school - history, geography, religion. Youngsters are accomplishing this process of integration in two opposed ways: either in form of high adjustment based on strong identification with the Turkish nation or in form of a simulated conformism paired with a rejection of the values of the home country. In the second case, the stay abroad is only positively looked upon and mostly idealized. In school second generation returnees criticize the sharp distance between student and teacher. Teachers again complain about the lack of discipline within the student body. For the great majority of second generation returnees - unless they have been able to achieve a successful entrance in mainstream Turkish society - the desire to return to Europe remains extremely high.

#### 5 - Governmental policies for returned migrants

Although Turkish politicians and administrators are repeatedly advising their compatriots to maintain strong affective ties with the home country while keeping their present jobs abroad, a series for re-integrating policies have been put into action over the years. The major facilitating migrant resettlement measures are -

- Lower custom duties and facilities on import of household good and imports of equipment for resettlement,

- Support and outbailing of workers enterprises created by the migrants with the purpose of preparing them work places upon their return,
- Fiscal and monetary incentives to invest in the country; sale of bonds shares in privatized state economic enterprises or public institutions such as toll bridges, roads; accounts in foreign currencies, transferable interest-bearing accounts,
- Better material and family environment: housing aid, special credits in the buying of second homes in vacation areas, easier entrance in housing cooperatives, recognition of diplomas, creation of bilingual classes in school giving priority admission to returning migrant children, facilitated re-admission of migrant children in normal schools.

Among the above cited measures the most used ones are a) the utilization of accounts in foreign currency in Turkish banks as interest rates in home country banks are almost double in comparison to European rates, b) acquisition of flats and summer houses built through governmental credit, to be bought in foreign currency. According a recent survey 38.9% of returned migrants have foreign exchange deposit accounts with the Turkish Central Bank, another 42.9% have similar accounts in other Turkish banks. Again 85.2% have bought real estate such as houses and plots of land (Central Bank Survey, 1986:5). The impact of this extensive wave of real estate investment has had a direct effect on rents which escalated very fast parallel to Turkey's undiminished rate of inflation in recent years. Thus the investment pattern of migrants can be looked upon as positive in regard of boosting construction industry, while negative in regard of the raise of average rents, house prices.

## 6 - Political behavior of returning migrants

This is a vast topic, too broad to be discussed in this paper in detail. Nevertheless it should be underlined that residency abroad encourages foreign worker's political expression to be oblique and nonorthodox. Unless they naturalize, migrant workers remain at least formal members of their native political systems. In the web of homeland governmental and social institutions and homeland political, cultural and social practices that accompany foreign labor migration is to be found a fertile environment nourishing continued migrant political identification with the homeland and interest in homeland political affairs.

Sociological studies of migrant workers have indicated that migrant workers interact frequently with compatriots, thereby encouraging continued homeland identification. The language barrier is another factor encouraging their interaction. The maintenance of identification with the homeland lies in the creation of overlapping social, cultural and economic homeland microcosms. Their major reference points continue to be homeland friends, the homeland cuisine, homeland culture, homeland association and political development in the homeland (M. J. Miller, 1981:43).

The great majority of returned Turks having lived in Federal Germany were subject to a deliberate policy of depolitization. So far only Sweden in 1975 and the Netherlands since three years have granted foreigners the right to vote in communal elections. This explains why over the time a significant number of Turkish migrants got involved with Turkish associations in Germany, which at the beginning served as surrogate trade unions, later acquired clear cut political colors. These associations started to recruit members cities and towns with a large Turkish concentration and became satellites of extremist rightist leftist, and fanatically religious political parties in the home country. Thus, on the one side the fascist leaning National Action Party, on the other side the ultra-conservative pro-Islamic National Salvation Party (today represented by the

Welfare Party) did establish sections and private schools in Federal Germany. While the branches of the rightist party were eventually dissolved, the schools remained. To what degree these small parties - at present not represented in parliament - as well as the government and major opposition parties in Turkey continue to cultivate special links with returned migrants is so far not assessed. Observations may lead to the conclusion that for the majority of returning migrants the present government party, ANAP, (Motherland Party) which promotes a liberal, market oriented program and strongly defends the merits of entrepreneurship, meets their political aspirations. Returning migrants living in a rather scattered way in Turkey's urban and rural settings, have so far not organized themselves in some kind of pressure group. Their existence passes unnoticed during electoral campaigns at home - the real target for political parties is the financial and moral support of the migrant groups abroad in view of influencing the left behind family members. Turkish citizens residing six months and longer abroad have been given the right to vote at all border entries since November 1987. The political participation of this group has been very low - a total of 49,800 casted votes - although six weeks prior of the general elections voting booths were set up at all airport entries and frontier gates.

#### 7 - Re-emigration and Turkish public opinion

Return migration does not occupy a central place in Turkish public opinion. This attitude might be partly explained by the fact that returned migrants are usually better off and more highly regarded in the community than their compatriots who have remained at home. The majority of the average Turkish citizens considers problems related to return should be solved on an individual level by rapid and unquestioned re-adjustment. Given the urgent priorities to primary needs of Turkey's population, special privileges to be accorded to returnees seems to be out of place. A survey realized in 1985 on behalf of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation by SIAR involving 528 returnees indicates that this

opinion is also shared by the migrants themselves. 77% of the respondents felt that all the problems which has emerged since their return could be handled personally. 73% of the respondents though that a major part of these problems stems from the negative attitude displayed by their direct environment. 61% believe that all problems related to reintegration can be solved in the long run, 26% consider these problems as unsolvable (PIAR/SIAR, 1985).

#### 8 - Informal networks abroad their impact on the home entry

The rural, family centered, regional or religious socialization expresses itself through informal social networks and keeps up the migratory chain, particularly through matrimonial bonds. Turks of the Black Sea region or Kurdish, Arcassian origin marry exclusively within their own group. They do not permit their daughter to marry outside their own group. The practice of endogamy is still the prevailing custom.

Thus, the participation in migratory chain by reconstructing a part of the family network abroad obliges the migrant and his family in a close interaction with the country of origin. This enables the village community, although geographically distant, to exercise a certain degree, of remote social control on its members abroad and reinforces ethnicity ties (Wilpert and Gitmez, 1987: 181).

#### Summing Up

Turkish migration has no doubt led to the emergence of a new social stratum. Those living in Europe, regardless of their place of employment, are called "Alamanyali" those from Germany. Those who migrated to Middle Eastern countries are labelled "migrating citizens". Both types are rooted in two countries. Predominantly employed in Europe, they tend to behave as privileged group at home. Their preference to live off of rental income or small business produces a type one might call "the proletarian bourgeois".

Returned migrants feel relatively secure due to their savings, purchasing power, life experience and pension. Their attitude toward the state, meaning bureaucratic apparatus of various kind has changed. Instead of considering

themselves subjects, they have learned abroad to become citizens. Although many of them were treated abroad in a discriminative way, reduced to second class citizenship, they learned to insist on their rights and ask for fair treatment. This feeling of self-reliance becomes much more evident once returned to the home country, where lack of attention on behalf of public services quickly becomes a topic of grievance. Bitter experiences abroad have produced more demanding citizens upon return.

The return process of the 60's and 70's represents rather a return of failure or conservatism comprising legal or illegal migrants who failed to adjust to the highly industrialized world they entered. This first wave of returnees, unable to realize their primary aim have mostly returned to the rural areas they came. Life since is slightly different from what it used to be before they left, the return movement of the 80's however represents both return for retirement and return of innovation. It also means a much better way of re-inserting in Turkey's mainstream society. For a significant part of returnees, who spent over 15 or more years abroad, return means the beginning of the last stage of their life in more comfort and security than they ever possessed. For those who still felt themselves sufficiently vigorous, full with enterprising spirit and physically able, returning home means a new challenge, which might yield success and high prestige.

Assumptions which were strongly asserted at the beginning of the migratory process such as "migration will serve to train skilled industrial manpower" appears to be partly valid in regions with fast industrialization. However, a lack of foresight, adequate planning and efficient organization has led to a substantial waste of human and financial resources mainly triggered off by local patriotism. The great willingness of Turkish migrants to contribute with their savings to the development of their own country in form of workers enterprises and village development cooperatives has not been sufficiently supported. Thus,

direct benefits of their return accrues rather in metropolitan areas and so far has created a limited positive impact in rural areas.

The second generation returnees which in many cases were forced to comply to the decision of their parents, represents the group facing the greatest amount of difficulties of readjustment. Most of them are confronted with a dilemma in terms of their cultural identity. The self-imposed isolation from the culture and mores of the host country adopted by their created a counter-culture for those who were born and grew up abroad and were socialized in the dominant culture. Their return implies such frustrating and disillusionment, nevertheless for many it represents a less stressful, sometimes even superior entrance in higher education institutions. For those who are able to pass the hurdles of admission to university the input of their linguistic skills paired with a determination to excel might produce in the near future some key elements within the elites of tomorrow.

The first and second generation "Alamanyali" represent a new generation in Turkey of those who dared to look for a future outside the national boundaries. Even if some of the returnees of today want to retain traditional values and customs and thus re-importing the ethnic boundaries they have self-imposed during their stay abroad, a significant part represents a new synthesis. In this capacity they are exercising an increasingly more felt permanent impact on Turkey's economic life and political choices.

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