

THE LEGAL STATUS OF TURKISH WOMEN

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To radically change the status of Turkish women and transform them into responsible, self-confident citizens was one of the major aspirations of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk. He cherished the ideals of equality between the sexes, equal opportunity for education, and a family life not based upon a life-long tie of one-sided bondage. These ideals led Atatürk to focus on eliminating the traditional Islamic norms and practices and introducing a secular, co-educational system. He used the revolutionary tools of legal reform and education to achieve his goal of equality for Turkish women (Abadan-Unat, 1981: 5.)

Yet, sixty years later, a multitude of problems still beset the Turkish women, especially those living in rural areas, which forces us to reconsider certain issues. To what extent can “revolution of legal systems” change the traditional lifestyles of the majority of women in a given country? Which major economic, social and/or political factors are directly or

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indirectly responsible for accelerating or retarding this process? Does religion, ideologically or morally, still maintain its decisive hold on the degree of women's social integration and political participation?

At this point one major point cannot be overlooked: Almost all major progressive measures in favor of Turkish women were given, rather than fought for. Unlike the evolution in the Western world, the heavily-centralized Ottoman state apparatus, as well as the absence of a pluralistic social structure, did not permit the emergence of a social movement in favor of improving the status of Turkish women. Feminism remained, until the present day, a social topic discussed solely by the intelligentsia male and female.

How then, can we explain the sudden transition to a European Civil Law system? Two major factors have to be taken into consideration: a) The carefully nurtured plans for modernization espoused by Mustafa Kemal and his closest collaborators, and b) the central role played by the new independent state in restructuring social arrangements. Particularly, it was this second factor that appeared to carry vital importance with regard to the status of women (Charred, 1983:3; Tilly, 1975).

In order to properly assess the impact of these different factors, it seems absolutely necessary to analyze the situation shortly before the transition to a Western type legal system. During the second term of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, an attempt was made to codify the 1917 Family Law bill. The commission approved of marriages at the age of nine for girls and ten for boys and of polygamy. It furthermore gave women the right to divorce their husbands only under certain conditions, but it upheld the right of men to repudiate their wives. The very mild, almost unnoticeable reaction of educated women to such measures became a matter of criticism in the Turkish press - Necmeddin Sadak in **Akşam** (1924) denounced the passive attitude of women. Even feminists, such as Halide Edip Adivar, expressed their criticism not from the point of view of women's rights, but rather from the angle of conditions favoring a harmonious married life.

Atatürk, anxious to present to the world a "modern face", began to encourage significant initiatives to eliminate the obvious inequalities in public life, thereby diminishing the political weight of the conservatives. An interesting example of such an action was the decision of the Istanbul chief of police to order the removal of a curtain separating men and women passengers in public transportation.¹ This decision became an issue in the

parliament, where it was asked whether or not it was contrary to the principles of a "Moslem Republic."

Atatürk, determined to fight against the conservative forces gathered around the Ministry of Sharia, succeeded in passing a legislation which definitely changed the ideological scope of public life. However, during the first term of the newly established Turkish parliament (established on April 23, 1920), the Turkish Grand National Assembly, a significant number of serious political fights occurred on issues relating to women. When these debates ended, no action was taken to modify the status of exploited women. Although Mustafa Kemal publicly acknowledged the heroic deeds of the Anatolian women in his speech of February 3, 1923 and promised that "Turkish women shall be free, enjoy education and occupy a position equal to that of men as they are entitled to it" (*Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, s. 147-148), the composition of the first Turkish parliament after World War I obliged him to postpone most of his reform plans. Society at that point was not ready to look upon women as equals with men. Speakers for the progressive wing, such as Tunalı Hilmi Bey, attempted several times to form the Turkish women's longing for equality into legal measures, but the conservative majority of clerks and smalltown merchants succeeded in blocking them.

Two parliamentary debates in particular further illustrate this negative attitude. The first, a bill concerning syphilis control (Session 122, 1921) (Taşkıran, 1973, 91-95) and the second, a bill dealing with the electoral law (Taşkıran, 1973,96-99; İnan, 1975; 134-138), led to violent discussions. Defenders of women's rights (Emin Bey and Tunalı Hilmi Bey) were not granted the floor; they were grossly insulted and the sessions were suspended. Proposals such as these, compelling women to have medical control and including the female population in the calculations for the size of voting districts, were bluntly refused. The decision of the Ministry of Education to invite all female teachers to the National Convention on Education led to a general investigation and finally ended with the resignation of the incumbent Minister (Taşkıran, 1973: 96).

However, Mustafa Kemal, during his various visits to the countryside, continued to declare himself in favor of egalitarian measures. He argued, for instance in Konya (March 21, 1923), about six months before the proclamation of the Republic, that "the fact that our women, who are subject to much less encouraging conditions, have been able to march along with men, sometimes even ahead of them, is clearcut proof of their equality

and their outstanding ability” (Karal, 1969: 56).

Thus, Mustafa Kemal, faithful to his farsighted strategy, kept on preparing the public opinion for deep-seated changes, the culmination of which was the adoption in totality of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926.

LEGAL EQUALITY FOR TURKISH WOMEN

Atatürk, determined to fight against the conservative forces gathered around the Ministry of Sharia, succeeded in passing a legislation, definitely changing the ideological scope of public life. The first law was the abolition of the Caliphate and the second the promulgation of the law for Unification of Instruction, both on the same day, March 3, 1924. The second law brought all religious schools and minority schools under unified control, thus enabling the leaders of the young Republic to extend the right to education to both sexes.

Determined not to wait for long term evolutionary processes, Atatürk proceeded from there to use codification as an accelerator of social change. On February 17, 1926, a slightly modified version of the Swiss Civil Code, which was found by the commission to be the most suitable to the principle of secularism, was adopted in one session where only speeches in favor were made. For Atatürk and his supporters, the granting of equality before the law was the realization of a promise made long ago, but even more than that, it was a symbol to the world that new Turkey was adamant about “reaching the level of contemporary civilization,” (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 85-87). Arguments in favor of the law also reflected such thought. The new law incorporated such principles as monogamy and the right to divorce - principles which are essential in a civilized world (TBMM, 1926). Thus, all of the major rights conferred on Turkish women were more a result of the unrelenting efforts of a small male ‘revolutionary elite’ than the product of large-scale demands by Turkey’s female population.

The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code was indeed the outcome of deep-rooted beliefs promoted by Atatürk and shared by the ruling strata of the early Republican period. For the founder of the Turkish Republic, the main function of the state was to make radical changes in the structure of the society, its institutions and values. His goal was the transformation of Turkey into a modern social system.

As part of this world view, there were important principles that necessitated fundamental changes in the family structure. The first was changing the legal foundation regulating the family life based on religious law. For Atatürk, the foundation and function of the family ought to be regulated by legal rules expressing the will of the “secular” state (Şeni, 1984: 90):

As Necat Erder rightly states (Erder, 1985: 11), in view of these revolutionary thoughts, Turkish jurists and social scientists could have undertaken a scientific analysis of the problems faced by the family in different sectors, strata, and regions, and draw the attention of the lawmakers to the realities of the society. However, the Turkish social scientists of that period did not have the accumulation of knowledge and experience necessary for such an undertaking. The extent to which religious rules actually affected social life and family relationships was not known. There was no satisfactory information on the scope and practice of polygamy. In the absence of empirical evidence on such critical issues jurists, involved in the law-making process, approached this task in a formalistic manner.² The final product was a code almost identical with the Swiss Civil Code, which went into effect on October 4, 1926 as the Turkish Civil Code. Actually the only important modification was the lowering of the marriage age.

This bold legal reform was of course not capable of changing the attitudes, customs and institutions overnight. In order to assess the real impact of these reforms let us first examine the scope, and impact of Turkey’s legal reforms on the status of women.

TURKISH CULTURE, LEGAL CHANGES, AND STATUS OF WOMEN

Since Turkey’s social reforms came about from an attempt to replace the Islamic legal system with a Western legal system, it seems imperative to assess briefly the evolution of the Turkish legal culture. The concept of legal culture has been defined, among others, by Friedman as “the network of values and attitudes relating to law which determines when, why, and where people turn to the law or away” (Friedman, 1969: 1004). By using this yardstick we can evaluate the way legal reforms have functioned in Turkey. Let’s first glance at the pre-Islamic period.

Little is known about the legal life of the early Turkish people. The

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available information is based upon early Chinese writings and modern archeological and ethnographic research. Turks placed strong emphasis on family. The patriarchal family, with the father as the ultimate authority, was the norm. Although women were under the guardianship of father or husband they assumed important roles —with the exception of taking military and official positions; in the ruling class they occupied an almost identical position with their husbands. Because society was so often at war, women enjoyed a certain freedom in managing the affairs of the family. Women were neither closeted in harems nor obliged to cover themselves before men. The only condition required for marriage was the consent of the guardians and the couple; the state was not involved in the marriage contract.

During the tenth and eleventh centuries, Turks all over Central Asia and the Middle and Near East were gradually, but not forcibly, converted to Islam (Kinross, 1977: 16). By this time, Islamic Law had undergone more than four hundred years of development and the Ottoman Turks inherited a Holy Law that admitted no further creative development.

Thus, while Islamic Law experienced further refinement in some areas, the Sunni norms governing marriage and divorce (and inheritance) remained set. Ottomans adopted this law so thoroughly that the old Turkish legal culture lost its distinct identity, resulting in a lowered status of Turkish women in both society and family. In the nineteenth century, with the advent of the Tanzimat edict in 1839, “imitative self defense” reforms, strongly influenced by the “Westernizers,” were adopted. In 1871 a commission was established to rewrite the Holy Law of Obligations and Contracts using the relevant Western codes as a guide, but its product, the “*Mecelle*,” did not touch the core of the Sacred Law, the Law of the Family. Nevertheless, the Ottomans developed institutions by which they could monitor, if not regulate, the institution of marriage. The imam was required to notify the state authorities of all marriages and thus the imam’s role became that of an official marriage registrar (Cin, 1974: 287).

At the beginning of the 20th century, in 1917, a special code for marriage and divorce was drafted. This code, adopted by the last Ottoman parliament and later repealed in 1919 under pressure from Islamic reactionaries, fell far short of bringing progressive rights. It approved of marriages at the age of nine for girls and ten for boys, and of polygamy. The only progressive aspect of this code was the prohibition of “cradle marriages” and the acceptance of certain conditions for the

oath of repudiation-the right of divorce, recognized one-sidedly for only the husband. This explains why Atatürk refused to discuss this project in the Turkish Grand National Assembly after the founding of the Turkish Republic (Abadan-Unat, 1981: 12).

Atatürk, determined to fight against the conservative forces, succeeded, as explained above, to pass a legislation aiming at the unification of education as well as the adoption of the principle of secularism by abolishing the Caliphate in 1924. These bold moves were followed, two years later, by the adoption of the Turkish Civil Code, which became effective on October 4, 1926. This new Code made polygamy illegal and gave equal rights in divorce, thus formally ensuring the freedom and equality of women. In divorce the custody of the children was now given to both parents (Art. 262); the court decided which parent should have custody (Art. 264). In practice, the custody of children under ten years of age was usually given to the mother. In case of death, custody was entrusted to the remaining parent. Marriage by proxy was abolished and marriage, in order to be valid, had to take place in the presence of the bride.

Equality in inheritance was granted (Art. 439), and equality with regard to testimony was accepted.

Finally, the new code prescribed a minimum age for marriage. At first the limit was eighteen for men and seventeen for women, but later, in 1938, these limits were reduced to seventeen and fifteen, respectively; the absolute minimum age was kept for men, but lowered to fourteen for women under special circumstances (Art. 85).

How egalitarian is the Turkish Civil Code? Its model, the Swiss Civil Code, imbued with certain democratic values, nevertheless still reflected a traditional point of view. The Swiss cantons realized gradual amendments that substantially improved the code. In Turkey, a special commission has been working on certain amendments for the past twenty years. The final draft presented in 1985 to the Turkish public opinion contains a great number of progressive new provisions. However, the draft has so far not been discussed publicly, and thus lacks the backing of the large public. Also it has not yet taken priority on the agenda of the Turkish parliament.

At present, there is no absolute equality between husband and wife. The husband is the head of the family. The wife cannot represent the marital union (Art. 154). The husband alone is entitled to choose a domicile and the wife must follow him (Art. 152, II). The wife is required to

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participate in the expenses of the household by contributing financially or by assuming tasks in the household (Art. 190). If the wife wants to assume professional work outside the household, she must obtain the tacit approval of the husband (Art. 195). However, the wife is free to dispose of her material goods. In marriage the rule is the separation of property and goods.

How has this legal transplantation functioned? Although Turkey's choice to adopt a Western legal code provided a favorable climate for change in the status of women, the code's real importance emerged only where socioeconomic structural changes totally changed the outlook of both sexes. Here, the Code has played an important role in serving as an instrument for the recognition of rights. In areas with a predominant feudal character, however, the Code has had little impact. Thus, legal dualism still exists to some degree. Proof of this is most evident in the situation of those children –fruits of *de facto* unions– who are deprived of their civic identity unless legal correction takes place. This vital problem was solved in two ways; from 1935 to 1956, the so-called “amnesty” laws legally recognized the paternity of such children and issued birth certificates to a total of 7.724.419 children in 1950 (Abadan-Unat, 1963: 23). After 1960, the lawmakers, realizing that the need and right of each individual to secure a judicial remedy in the case of personal identity should be under constitutional guarantee, adopted Law No. 2526, which introduced a simplified procedure for recognizing paternity. At the same time the Constitutions of 1961 and 1982, recognizing the paramount importance of the family, and of mother and child in particular, entrusted the State to take special measures for protection.

With the changing social structure of the Turkish society, demands for radical changes in the Turkish Civil Code for more “equal rights” have been advanced in the press and through women's associations. During the Women's Year in 1975, the following demands were proclaimed by 27 women's associations at a conference convened in December 1975 in Ankara:

1. The status of head of the family should not be confined solely to the husband,
2. The wife should not be obliged to adopt the husband's family name,
3. The prerogative of a husband to forbid his wife the practice of a profession or employment outside the household should be abolished;

4. Legal, educational, and administrative measures should be implemented aiming at the abolishment of “bride price”;

5. The prohibition of a religious ceremony before a civil marriage is registered should be reinforced;

6. In order to equalize tax obligations, individual income tax declarations for husband and wife should be required;

7. The right to join the armed forces should be reinstated;

8. Women civil servants and workers should be able to take one year of paid leave of absence after childbirth;

9. The agricultural Social Insurance bill should be passed immediately in order to assure the peasant women of social security rights;

10. The living conditions of prostitutes should be improved; and,

11. Female children, who have apparently been “adopted,” but are in fact employed in domestic service (*besleme*), should not be left without legal protection, their exploitation should be strictly forbidden (Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği, 1978).³

From the eleven demands, enumerated above, the one pertaining to benefitting from the Social Security system in rural areas has been granted in 1985 by the Özal government, also stipulating that female heads of families are eligible in this scheme. Thus, the concept of “female head of the family” has become a legal concept without entering the Civil Code.

POSITION OF THE TURKISH WOMEN IN OTHER LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS SUCH AS THE PENAL CODE

There is no doubt that the most critical point lies in the nature of institutionalized prostitution. According to Law No. 1593, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and the Ministry of the Interior are jointly responsible for determining the location and the administration of brothels. Art. 129 of this same law mentions a category of women, “who are performing prostitution as a profession and as a means subsistence.” This article is in direct contradiction to Art. 435-36 of the Turkish Penal Code, which strongly forbids activities which encourage prostitution. Prostitution is a social problem deeply related to socio-economic factors. Thus, it is impossible to prevent it solely by applying deterrent measures. Yet, in Turkey the fact that the woman in question is a prostitute is still seen as a criterion

for attenuating circumstances, leading to a reduction by two thirds of the sentence in cases of rape and kidnapping (Turk. Penal Code, Art. 438). This article, which was taken over from the Italian Penal Code, has been abolished in Italy. Unfortunately, the Turkish public opinion so far has not pressed for its elimination.

Another important piece of legislation, granting Turkish women new rights in the field of family planning also deserves attention. Due to the heavy losses caused by a series of wars culminating with World War I and the War of Independence, the official population policy until 1960 was based on strict rules prohibiting any kind of family planning. Abortion was forbidden, punishable by 2-5 years in prison (Penal Code, Art. 468-572). This outlook began to be altered with the acceptance of the first Five-Year Development Plan. The yearly population increase of 2.6% disturbed the planners a great deal. The first plan concerning population control was promulgated on April 1, 1965. This law (Nr. 11 976) contained provisions regulating the distribution of contraceptives and the conditions required for medically indicated abortion as well as sterilization. The major criterion was an imminent danger for the life of the mother and/or the child. This law, however, was not widely known and illegal abortions, resulting in the death of mothers due to unhealthy, highly risky practices, continued. After the military intervention of 1980, this issue was reconsidered. Before the transition to the multiparty system and without any noticeable pressure or articulated demands from the female population or some women's organizations, the incumbent government presented the parliament with a bill to have abortion upon request to be permitted. In case of married couples, the wife had to prove the consent of the husband. This law (May 27, 1983 - No. 2827) also forseees the possibility of permitting abortion for minors if their tutors register their consent at a public notary. Under the present conditions, abortions can be carried out both in public hospitals (for a nominal sum) and in private clinics, until the tenth week of pregnancy.

POLITICAL RIGHTS

Because of historical reasons, such as being excluded from active economic participation and from public life, Turkish women never developed a genuine and effective suffragette movement. Demands to be permitted to participate in election activities were first expressed hesitantly, then neglected for some time, and then these rights were finally granted.

Relevant sources on this subject furnish opposing explanations. According to Tezer Taşkıran, the driving forces for political rights were the publicly articulated demands of the Turkish Women's League in 1927 and growing pressure of public opinion (Taşkıran, 1973: 72-73). Afet İnan, Atatürk's adoptive daughter, a historian, gives a different explanation. According to İnan, difficulties in teaching democratic rules as part of civics education as long as women were deprived of political rights, gave way to serious discussions within Atatürk's inner circle and thereby led to a constitutional amendment (İnan, 1969: 304; TBMM, 1930). Ş. Tekeli, a young political scientist, has developed a hypothesis which is based on an overall evaluation of the Western powers, attitude, reflected by their press, towards Atatürk's transitional one-party rule. Her hypothesis is that the sudden granting of the right to participate in municipal elections in 1930 to the Turkish women and later in 1934 to participate in national elections, paired with the right to run for a seat in parliament, was triggered by the strong desire of Atatürk to differ from other fascist movement leaders (Tekeli, 1981: 296-297; Tekeli, 1982: 212-215). Thus on December 5, 1934, the Grand National Assembly adopted a proposal presented by İsmet İnönü and 191 deputies, which conferred on all Turkish citizens above the age of 22, the right to vote in national elections. It is worthwhile to note that one of the speakers in favor of this bill, Sadri Maksudi, stated: "Today there are countries which have undemocratic regimes, where women are deprived of political rights. The granting of political rights to Turkish women is a natural consequence of Turkey's evolution toward a true democratic system" (Tekeli, 1977: 69).

It deserves to be mentioned that because no genuine struggle for political rights were waged by the Turkish women, it seems correct to evaluate the situation as an outcome of a still partially patriarchal society. As Yeşim Arat correctly states, the question of woman's rights was a means rather than an end for the founders of the Turkish Republic who instituted the reform (Arat, 1983: 52). However, legal inequalities were abolished and women's rights to participate in public life were recognized much earlier than in a number of European countries, such as France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Cyprus, Switzerland, Portugal and Lichtenstein (Sivard, 1985: 162) (see Table 1). After 1980 and the return to democracy, a number of political parties elected women as their deputy chairpersons, and a newly-founded social democratic party is headed by a woman (R. Ecevit). Thus, in spite of an undeniable absence of change in patriarchal values, Turkish women are becoming more active in public life to the degree that

they are subjected to structural changes such as urbanization, industrialization, more education, and participation in the labor force.

CONCLUSION

Scholars dealing with the issue of changing the status of women in the Middle East make interesting comparisons, especially between Turkey and Egypt. In the latter country, receptiveness to Western thought and publications in favor of women's emancipation started as early as late 19th century under the leadership of the Al-Azhar trained, religious figure Abdou and a secular thinker Quasım Amin (1868-1908). These two important Egyptian public figures played an important role in shaping the thinking of the ruling elites. Yet, as Leila Ahmet points out (Ahmet, 1984: 159), although the issue of women was an important topic among Egyptian intellectuals, as it was among Turks, no government, party or male person with access to power adopted it as a central issue and this made a difference in the evolution of the women's movement in Egypt. Because Islam and feminism are basically incompatible – as Atatürk found out – this incompatibility especially with regard to the legal status of women, can be resolved only if any significant advances are made as was made by Atatürk, who deliberately broke off from the Islamic tradition in determining the position and rights of women (Ahmet, 1984: 162).

Thus, as already pointed out at the beginning, it is the role the state is determined to assume which also determines the role of its female population in society. In this respect the role of the law maker is vitally important. Comparing Turkey with Tunisia also yields important insights. The position Bourghuiba endorsed deserves special attention. No doubt, among all Arab countries, Tunisia has followed the most similar political path to Turkey. However, the Tunisian nationalist leader, and later head of state, preferred not to break with Tunisia's Islamic past. The Code of Personal Status, which was adopted after independence, remained faithful to Islamic principles; nevertheless, it aims at achieving relative equality between husband and wife by prohibiting polygamy and requiring divorce to take place before the court, thus outlawing the husband's unilateral right to repudiate his wife. These provisions clearly show that Tunisian legislators preferred accomodation instead of deep entrenched reforms. Thus, there is no question that only Turkey, among all Islamic countries, and predominantly as the result of Atatürk's farsighted political views, opted for a total remodeling of the legal structure of Turkish society.

Finally, in evaluating the revolutionary experiment of using law as an instrument of social change, one must start by accepting the fact that the Turkish Civil Code is not perceived as ideal. For the conservatives, it has remained alien to tradition and custom, for the progressives, it is not egalitarian enough. The first group would eventually wish to return to the Sharia. The adherents of this view, although strong in certain areas, have thinned out greatly in recent years. At the other end of the spectrum, the second group argues that the more “progressive” and “modern” aspects of the intent of the law have been intentionally neglected by a conservative judiciary. Between the two poles lies the majority view that the Code is essentially well-suited to the needs of the people. The merit of the majority view lies in the effort of the judiciary who succeeded in introducing a foreign system of family law into the Turkish legal culture. The same attitude can be witnessed in the jurisdiction of the Turkish State Council. Thus, one can conclude that the Turkish legal culture, due to its confrontation with different legal systems, has gained from this interaction and acquired its own Turkish identity by a steadily improving jurisprudence in the direction of more equality and a larger understanding of human rights. From time to time the idealistic vision of the modernized society Atatürk has conceived faces serious challenges, but the legal foundations laid are strong and resistant enough to overcome these obstacles and liberate the Turkish women from all kinds of legal exploitation.

Notes

- (1) According to a regulation issued in 1923, “husband and wife may sit next to each other, provided they are not acting against the law in public transportation vehicles. No police can prevent an honorable woman from sitting next to her husband” (Abadan-Unat, 1981: 13).
- (2) For the purely legalistic views that have dominated the setting up of the rules on the family in the Turkish Civil Code, See: Güriz and Benedict (ed.), 1974: XII-XIV.

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(3) The Minister of Justice, N. Eldem. of T. Özal's government presented in April 1985 a comprehensive bill concerning major changes in the Turkish Civil Code. However this bill, which is the product of a committee of experts which worked on the proposals for almost six years, has not been made formally public and thus has so far not been sufficiently discussed in relevant circles such as the Bar Association, etc. The bill has been introduced on the agenda of the parliament, but without urgency request. The bill contains a number of progressive articles such as the recognition of the right to work outside the home to the wife, the right to keep her maiden and/or professional name, and the abolition of the husband's monopoly with regard to representing the family union.

Table I. Dates of Women's Right to Vote ★

1893 New Zealand	1952 Bolivia, Greece
1902 Australia	1953 China, Jamaica, Mexico
1906 Finland	1954 Colombia
1913 Norway	1955 Ethiopia, Ghana, Nicaragua, Peru
1915 Denmar, Iceland	1956 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta
1917 USSR	1957 Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon, Malaysia
1918 Austria	1958 Albania, Algeria, Iraq, Somalia
1919 Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden	1959 Cyprus, Mauritius, Morocco
1920 Canada, United States	1960 Nigeria, Zaire
1922 Ireland	1961 Burundi, Gambia, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania
1924 Mongolia	1962 Uganda
1928 Germany, United Kingdom	1963 Iran, Kenya, Libya
1929 Ecuador	1964 Afghanistan, Malawi, Zambia
1930 South Afriha (white)	1965 Botswana, Singapore
1931 Spain, Sri Lanka	1966 Guyana, Lesotho
1932 Brazil, Thailand	1967 Yemen People's Democratic Republic
1934 Cuba, Turkey, Uruguay	1968 Swaziland
1935 Burma	1970 Fiji
1938 Bulgaria, Philippines	1971 Switzerland
1942 Dominican Republic	1972 Bangladesh
1945 France, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago	1974 Jordan
1946 Benin, Italy, Liberia, Romania, Yugoslavia	1976 Portugal
1947 Argentina, Malta, Togo, Venezuela, Vietnam	1984 Lichtenstein
1948 Belgium, Israel, North and South Korea	
1949 Chile, Costa Rica, India, Syria	
1950 Barbados, El Salvador	
1951 Nepal	

★ Dates are not available for: Angola, Bahrain, Brunei, Cambodia, Equatorial, Guinea, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Yemen Arab Republic, and Zimbabwe.

Table II: Women in Turkish Parliament (1935 - 1983)

Years	AssemblyW.	Dep.	Total	%	Senate	Senate	%	Total W	% Parl
1935-39	V	18	395	4.5	—	—	—	18	4.5
1939-43	VI	15	400	3.7	—	—	—	15	3.7
1943-46	VII	16	435	3.7	—	—	—	16	3.7
1946-50	VIII	9	455	1.9	—	—	—	9	1.9
1950-54	IX	3	487	0.6	—	—	—	3	0.6
1954-57	X	4	535	0.7	—	—	—	4	0.7
1957-60	XI	7	610	1.1	—	—	—	5	0.8
1961-65	1	3	450	0.7	2	165	1.2	5	0.8
1965-69	2	8	450	1.7	3	165	1.8	11	1.7
1969-73	3	5	450	1.1	3	165	1.8	8	1.3
1973-77	4	6	450	1.3	3	165	1.8	9	1.5
1977-80	5	4	450	0.9	3	165	1.8	7	1.2
1983-	1	12	400	3.0	—	—	—	12	3.0

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